



Evaluation Services IQC

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS AND PRIORITIES FOR ACTION IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA

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
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1. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a large and diverse country with a multitude of opportunities and constraints. In recognition of this, the USAID Mission in Abuja previously commissioned a strategic assessment of social sector needs and priorities in the northern part of Nigeria. The Mission also saw need to examine the important development issues facing the southern part of the country, which consists of 17 states divided into three zones, the Southeast, the South-South and the Southwest. Special characteristics of the south include a high degree of urbanization, higher levels of industrialization, especially the petroleum industry and concomitantly higher levels of pollutions and environmental degradation. Higher levels of education also characterize the South for both men and women and relatively lower levels of poverty, but ironically, higher levels of unemployment. Agriculture is still a major component of the southern economy and contributes to environmental problems and is in turn affected by pressures from urbanization.



USAID has a history of investment and involvement in the southern zones as seen in Table 1. Democracy and Governance interventions have worked at the grassroots with civil society organizations and legislative bodies in Lagos, Ondo, Delta, Rivers and Cross River States, to name a few. Agricultural programs have ranged from research on resistant strains of staple food crops to farmer-to-farmer extension efforts at the community level in Oyo, Abia and Cross River States. Environmental interventions in Cross River State demonstrate collaboration between the environment and agricultural sectors in controlling deforestation through the promotion of tree crops.

In the social sector, innovative efforts to integrate the community, the government and the private sector in reproductive health are taking place in Enugu and Oyo States. Efforts to strengthen women's reproductive health rights through community-based organizations (CBOs) have taken place in Anambra, Ondo and Ekiti States. Similar partnerships have been promoted for enhancing child survival in Lagos

and Abia States. Educational efforts have ranged from enhancing primary school teacher performance in Lagos State and workforce development training for youth in Delta and Lagos States. In HIV/AIDS, local government action committees and CBOs have also been empowered to prevent the disease and provide care and support for those affected, including orphans in Lagos, Anambra, and Rivers States.

Table 1: Past, Current and Future USAID Investments

Zone	State	Strategic Objective/Sector: States and Programs			
		SO11 D&G	SO12 Agri/Econ/Env	SO13 Social Sector	SO14 HIV/AIDS/TB
Southeast	Abia		RUSEP - IITA, farmer-to-farmer	BASICS,	PSRHH
	Anambra			ENABLE-CEDPA	IMPACT (FHI), (future focal state)
	Enugu	Legislatures		VISION (repro. health consortium), ENABLE-CEDPA	PSRHH
South-South	Delta	CSOs (future focal state)		Workforce (OICI)	
	Rivers	CSOs CEDPA, Legislatures (future focal state)	IITA Onne station banana research		Africare (C&S), (future focal state)
	Cross River	CSOs CEDPA	Tree-crop Ag/Environ collaboration		PSRHH
	Edo	Human Trafficking Prevention, Legislatures (future focal state)			PSRHH
Southwest	Oyo		IITA – ADIATN mildew resistant maize, mosaic resistant cassava	VISION, IITA (micronutrient)	PSRHH, NELA
	Lagos	BASICS' CPHs, Legislatures		BASICS, LEAP, Workforce	IMPACT, PSRHH (future focal state)
	Ogun		Winrock Farmer-to-Farmer fishponds		
	Ondo, Ekiti			COWAN/CEDPA reproductive health + economic rights	

1.1 Scope of Work (Abridged)¹

The geographical coverage of this assessment will be the Southwest, South South, and Southeast zones. The Strategic Analysis is intended to provide a comprehensive overview of significant issues and the dynamics attending them in the three southern geopolitical zones. The study will also provide an analytic framework that will assist the USAID Mission to identify strategic directions for the Country Strategic Plan 2004-2009 as well as key points of entry for future programming in Southern Nigeria. The Mission has identified five core issues for the analysis. This does not preclude the identification, consideration and analysis of additional issues that might emerge as significant concerns in the course of the assessment. **Gender** and **urbanization** are critical crosscutting themes that must be addressed for each priority area.

¹ The full SOW is provided in Annex A.

Priority Issue 1: The Environment: An environmental assessment conducted for USAID/Nigeria in early 2002 identified three key environmental threats to the country: 1) unsustainable use of renewable natural resources, especially forests, 2) unplanned urban development with resulting water shortages and pollution, waste disposal problems and unregulated construction, and 3) petroleum industry operations.

Priority Issue 2: Agriculture: Nigeria must now import a substantial proportion of its food supply. The annual increase in total production of major food crops has not exceeded one percent per year over the past decade, against a population growth rate of close to three percent, and cassava, yam and rice production have gone down. Declining soil fertility, low input use, high post harvest losses, lack of value adding processing capacity, lack of access to land in some communities, and poor competitiveness of Nigerian products on local, regional and international markets have all contributed to the poor performance of the agricultural sector. Development and transfer of productivity-enhancing, loss-reducing, and value-adding technologies is key to the transition from subsistence to market.

Priority Issue 3: Conflict: Localized conflicts have become increasingly frequent in Nigeria over the past decade and have been particularly troublesome in the South. These conflicts often result from competition over scarce resources, particularly land, or from feelings of disenfranchisement and alienation from the social, political, and/or economic mainstream. USAID/Nigeria has worked to create a national network of NGOs to identify, mitigate, and increasingly to seek to prevent conflict at the community level. This issue has strong links to job creation and employment, agricultural growth, and HIV/AIDS prevention.

Priority Issue 4: Unemployment and Workforce Development: The average per capita income in Nigeria is very low (US\$300-\$350 in 2000), with the number of people living below the poverty line estimated at 70 percent. Opportunities for formal-sector jobs are diminishing in relation to the number of job seekers, and at least 80 percent of Nigeria's workforce is employed in the informal sector, including agriculture. The system of basic education does not prepare young people for the job market. Unemployment is highest among 15-24 year olds, and with secondary school leavers. Unemployment in the large towns of southern Nigeria may exceed 40 percent, and 30 percent of secondary school age youth are not in school. Nigeria needs to prepare young people for working careers, and to expand private sector opportunities for employment.

Priority Issue 5: HIV/AIDS: Over the past 12 years, HIV seroprevalence in Nigeria has increased by over 300 percent. Almost six percent of adults – 3.5 to 4 million people – are infected, and the youthfulness of the population and the early initiation of sexual activity create the potential for explosive growth of the epidemic in the near future.

1.2 Major Themes/Conceptual Framework

The assessment was guided by three major concepts.

First, there are Zonal Distinctions; the southern part of Nigeria is not monolithic. Not only is each of the three zones distinct culturally, economically and environmentally, but also there are key differences among states within zones.

Secondly, there are Crosscutting and Integrating Issues that underlie a variety of development concerns can influence potential solutions including gender and urbanization. In addition, the core issues also interrelate such as the environmental impact of agricultural land use practices and the fact that environmental degradation causes loss of jobs as land is no longer usable.

Thirdly, based on the foregoing, the solutions to development problems in the south must be multi-sectoral and multi-level including 1) Community Based Interventions, 2) Public-Private Partnerships and 3) an Enabling Policy Environment.

1.3 Methodology of Work

Work began with a preliminary team planning meeting (TPM) at MSI Headquarters in Washington between MSI staff and the two US based consultants. At that TPM the following procedures were outlined: 1) an initial in-briefing for the consultants with USAID Abuja staff, 2) an in-country team planning meeting in Lagos, 3) establishment of a base of operations at Support and Management Services, Ltd. (SMS) in Lagos wherein a library would be assembled and communications and logistics would be handled, 4) 7-10 days of fieldwork in selected states, 5) a mid-term briefing with USAID staff, 6) further fieldwork and report writing, 7) a final briefing of USAID staff in Abuja, and 8) finalization of the report in Washington. In broad terms these steps were followed, but had to be modified in light of logistical, administrative and political realities in the field.

The in-briefing process with Mission staff in Abuja spanned three days (23-25 June 2003) in order for the consultant to meet representatives from all four Strategic Objective (SO) groups and staff responsible for the overall strategic assessment and planning processes. This time span was necessitated by the fact that each SO Team is actively working on its own plans and therefore, all could not be assembled for one overall meeting. This process actually had the benefit on allowing each SO Team to explain more fully its own concerns and activities. In addition to team interviews, the Mission also arranged for production of electronic and print background documents for the consultants to review. These were later divided and shared among the Nigerian technical experts according to their area of interest.

It had been hoped that representatives from the two local consultancy firms, African Institute for Applied Economics (AIAE) and the Center for African Settlement Studies and Development (CASSAD), would have been part of the in-briefing in Abuja, but due to fact that their contracts were still being negotiated, they were reluctant to travel. These firms were later able to send representatives to attend an in-country TPM in Lagos on 27 June based at the offices of our logistics support firm, SMS. At this TPM, areas of expertise were reviewed, technical and supervisory assignments given, and fieldwork planned. The technical assignments are reflected in the authorship of the full Technical Working Papers found in the Annexes of this report. The plan included two technical teams, one of which would cover Rivers and Cross River States and the second would work in Anambra and Lagos States. SMS dispatched a staff member over the weekend to make arrangements in Port Harcourt. Fieldwork was supposed to span the period of 30 June to 8 July leading up to a mid-term briefing with Mission staff in Lagos on the 9th of July. Additional writing and field work would then be undertaken based on feedback at the mid-term briefing, leading to a final team work and writing session on the 18th of July that would help prepare a final briefing in Abuja on the 21st of July.

One difficulty experienced at the TPM stage was the fact that the two consultants from AIAE were not currently available, but were attempting to return from conferences they had been attending outside the country. A second and more troubling difficulty was the threatened national labor strike over increased petroleum product prices.

The weeklong strike did take place. Consultants from CASSAD had arrived in Lagos for the fieldwork preparation meeting on 30 June, but were stranded in their hotel for two days. Fortunately the availability of GSM/cell phones made it possible for the technical and logistical team members to remain in communication, and eventually a meeting was held with three MSI consultants, CASSAD consultants and SMS staff on July 1. It was agreed that with the library resources available to CASSAD in its own offices and at the Nigerian Institute for Economic and Social Research (NISER) in Ibadan, supplemented by electronic documents collected by the MSI consultants, the CASSAD team would return to their home

offices to draft their working papers for the duration of the strike. Likewise the MSI consultants continued to work with electronic documents, obtain additional information from Internet sources and undertake some interviews by phone. The strike itself illustrated some of the very problems the team was studying. Unemployment and poverty made the increased petroleum prices hard to bear and in turn could force employed people from jobs. Conflict was rife as people protested in the streets over government's unilateral decision to raise prices. Lives were lost and property destroyed, particularly in urban areas.

The five CASSAD consultants were able to use the time effectively to produce draft working papers on their assigned topics, and were able to present these to the Mission representative on the 9th of July as planned. Fortunately, the AIAE consultants had by that time arrived in the country and were able to present a preliminary outline of their technical areas. It was agreed that SMS would need lead time to re-arrange field appointments, so it was agreed that the consultants would return to their bases, continue refining their working papers and then reassemble on the 13th of July for field visits. In the meantime, the two MSI consultants conducted interviews and continued to review documents in Lagos.

Fieldwork finally took place between 14 and 18 July. This was obviously shorter than originally planned, but was by that time constrained by the workdays contracted with the Nigerian consultants and travel schedules of the MSI consultants. A final team meeting was held in Lagos on 19th July to assemble findings and discern gaps. A debriefing was held with one of the MSI consultants on 21st July. Over the next two weeks, all consultants continued to revise their working drafts, conduct Internet searches to validate information about issues and implementing Partners, and communicate by e-mail. The latter proved particularly challenging because 1) some of the consultants had exceeded their budgeted days and 2) several had other work commitments that inhibited their timely submission of revised papers.

The Mission was kept apprised of these difficulties and they proposed that an additional scope of work be developed to address gaps in data and weaknesses in interpretation. The recommendations of this report address this need for additional study, while at the same time recognizing that the Mission needs timely information to develop its strategic plan for Washington.

Technical Working Paper Assignments:

Technical Areas	Primary Author	Affiliation	Editing
Core			
Environment	Jeje	CASSAD	McCorry
Agriculture	Achike	AIAE	McCorry
Conflict	Nnoli	AIAE	Brieger
Unemployment	Ndekwu	CASSAD	Brieger
HIV/AIDS	Uwakwe	CASSAD	Brieger
Cross-cutting			
Urbanization	Onibokun	CASSAD	(annex only)
Gender	Adebayo	CASSAD	(annex only)

2. TECHNICAL REPORTS

This section contains the summary technical reports of the five main priority issues outlined in the scope of work. The detailed working papers for each technical area are found as annexes to the report. In addition, the annexes contain the working papers on the crosscutting issues of urbanization and gender, as well as case studies to provide additional illustration.

2.1 The Environment in Southern Nigeria

In many respects the issue of sound environmental management might be seen as the focal crosscutting issue for USAID in developing an intervention strategy for Southern Nigeria. All of the priority issues, as well as the crosscutting items, that were identified in the team's Terms of Reference have special relevance in the Southern Zone. Adding to this mix the technical and scientific complexity of many proposed solutions only heightens the challenges confronting USAID and its partners in Nigeria's development. The World Bank, for example, has proposed a set of principles based upon a poverty reduction strategy that may be a tool for resolving some of the problems that arise in the southern sections of the country.

2.1.1 Zonal Distinctions

The most important environmental problem in the South-East is massive soil erosion, while in the South-South, it is primarily deforestation, the loss of biodiversity and, problems specific to oil exploitation, e.g., spills and gas flaring. A significant challenge for the Southwest is coastal erosion. As a general matter, the entire region suffers from the loss of ground cover and land degradation, poor soil fertility and poor solid waste management. It is important to add, however, that some environmental problems may be exacerbated by human activities. Leaving aside the obvious impact that can follow from deliberate violence and destructive actions, traditional farming practices may also create adverse effects. Zonal distinctions in priority environmental issues are seen in Table 1.

Table 1: Priority of Environmental Problems

Problem Type	Problem Source	Zone			
		South-South		Southeast	Southwest
		Rivers State	Cross River State		
Land Resource Degradation	Erosion:				
	Coastal	X			X
	River bank	X		X	
	Agricultural Land Degradation	X	X	X	
	Urban Flooding				X
Renewable Resource Degradation	Forestry:				
	Deforestation	X	X	X	
	Freshwater forest degradation	X			
	Barrier island forest degradation	X			
	Biodiversity loss	X	X	X	X
Environmental Pollution	Water Contamination: Sewage				X
	Air Pollution: Municipal			X	X

Modified from Moffat and Linden (1995); supplemented with fieldwork (Jeje: 2001-03).

The States of the region appear to share a common underlying set of socio-economic problems that impinge on the environment. Elevated levels of unemployment and poverty promote inappropriate and overexploitation of natural resources including land. Government has demonstrated a lack of sustained commitment to rural development programs. There are weakness and biases in the political and legal frameworks, which govern economic and environmental policies and actions and this leads to failures in regulatory and enforcement capabilities.

2.1.2 Donor Organizations Active on Zonal Environmental Issues

Donor investment into Nigeria's environment began in earnest in the late 1980s. Many of these early donor investments focused on local-level environmental problems in high profile regions of Nigeria (e.g., the Niger Delta). Other initiatives sought to address the local effects of regional or global environmental problems (e.g., desertification). By the early-1990s a considerable number of multilateral and bilateral organizations were financing specific environment/environment-related initiatives. This level of assistance continued through the mid-1990s, until the establishment of military rule. Although many multilateral donor-funded programs remained in place during the military regime, the majority of the bilateral investment into the environment sector was suspended. Since the return to democratic norms of governance a number of the bilateral organizations have resumed their programs of assistance in this sector. Indeed, in an effort to "coordinate" donor activities, a Thematic Donor Group on the Environment has been established. The Group, co-chaired by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and UNDP, meets quarterly to share information on partner activities in an effort to allow funds to be leveraged and to minimize overlap and duplication.

The list of organizations in the following paragraphs is selective rather than exhaustive. It is intended to provide an overview of the range of actors and the financial resources that are addressing some of the region's environmental problems. It should be noted, however, especially for the multilateral donor agencies, the interventions highlighted may not be exclusively directed to the southern states and their communities.

In addition, an abiding issue is the extent to which the three levels of Nigeria's government can contribute to the overall cost of the interventions described here. There are unresolved questions concerning equity and fairness in revenue allocations and the operational roles of several national and regional organizations in the South.

USAID Environmental Interests and Interventions

According to the Mission's 2002 Annual Report, environment is approached in the context of agriculture and economic growth. "Recognizing the need to address inadequate production and stagnant productivity as critical components of poverty alleviation and long-term sustainable development, the Mission will increase its focus on the agriculture sector in coming years, including appropriate interventions in biotechnology and the environment." Environmental issues are addressed, for example, through the Sustainable Tree Crops Program, which has an obvious focus in southern Nigeria.

Contrary to what is found in the Missions annual report, consultants who produced the strategic assessment on the environment (ARD, 2002) perceived that, "the Mission does not support an environment program, per se," and encouraged the mission to become more involved in the "environmental arena" especially in the areas of "water use and water quality, soil and water conservation, gene pools of wild/traditional crops and the management of tree crops, and (non-timber forest products) could provide added benefits for ongoing programs and count considerably towards

increasing conservation and environmental awareness.”² The report also suggested that environmental aspects of other USAID Nigeria program components be developed and conversely, that greater intervention in environmental management would enhance other USAID program areas in Nigeria, for example conflict mitigation.

Multilateral Interventions in the Environment Sector

World Bank: The World Bank has historically been the most active multilateral organization in the environmental sector. During the 1990s, the World Bank supported numerous projects and activities (Environmental Management Project, Fadama I, etc.) in the environment and environment-related sectors, the large majority of which came to a close between 1996 and 1998. Currently the World Bank is developing a new programming cycle that will include two large credit projects in the environment sector. These projects are:

- Fadama II is being designed to support necessary infrastructure and institutions to expand small-scale irrigation in Nigeria. The project is also looking to provide support to the pastoral sector. Ultimately, Fadama II will strive to promote the development of linkages between farmer interest groups and the private sector. Fadama II will very likely have a Global Environment Facility (GEF)-financed component to address issues of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use of renewable natural resources. Currently the World Bank and GEF are working with the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMOE) to develop the GEF component.
- Local Empowerment and Environmental Management Program (LEEMP) is a combination of two earlier planned projects (the Micro Watershed and Environmental Management Project and the Community and Local Government Development Project). LEEMP will channel considerable financial and technical resources to support natural resources governance and management at the community level. The project will very likely contain a GEF-financed component that will work with the National Parks Service (NPS) and NGOs to improve protected area and buffer zone management in and around Yankari and Kainji National Parks.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): In Nigeria, the FAO supports two types of initiatives: Technical Cooperation Programs (TCP) and Unilateral Trust Fund (UTF) Projects. TCPs are funded through the FAO investment center in Rome. UTFs are funded through a trust fund, paid into by the GFRN on an annual basis. In Nigeria, FAO activities focus “on-farm”, and many are targeted at increasing food security. However, FAO also supports environmental activities; of particular interest is the planned TCP-funded Streamlining Environmental Law Project—while still under development, it is expected that this project will focus on aspects of biosafety and biotechnology.

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD): IFAD, with World Bank and FAO assistance, is implementing two large projects. The first is the Root and Tuber Expansion Program, which is targeting 26 states in the mid-south. The second project is the The Community-Based Agriculture and Rural Development Program (\$28.6 million), which is targeting eight states in the north.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP): In Nigeria, the UNDP is most active in the environment sector through its Sustainable Agriculture, Environment and Rural Development Program, which strives to improve food security and environmental management through work with poor smallholder farmers, fishermen and rural artisans. In this approach, the UNDP/Nigeria is working to provide an integrated framework to address the linked problems of poverty, food insecurity and environmental degradation. Specifically, Program activities strive to enhance the production, productivity and incomes of smallholder farmers, fishermen, and artisans, as well as to improve their access to credit

² Nigerian Environmental Analysis Final Report (April 2002) submitted to USAID, Nigeria by ARD, Burlington, Vermont.

and productive assets. As part of this effort, the UNDP is working to improve physical access to rural markets, and is focusing these activities on between eight and 15 communities per state.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): UNICEF is currently supporting a range of activities in the urban sector, and has also been active in small-scale activities designed to increase the provision of safe drinking water in rural parts of Nigeria. One ongoing UNICEF-funded activity is the Urban Services Program, where UNICEF is seeking to enhance the provision of basic urban/municipal services; specifically, potable drinking water, electricity and waste disposal. This program stresses collaboration with communities, and works with a range of NGOs.

World Health Organization (WHO): While focused primarily on health issues, a number of WHO activity areas relate directly to environmental health. In Nigeria, the WHO activity that is most relevant for the environment sector is the Healthy Cities Program. Through this program, WHO is conducting health surveillance studies, and helping the government to establish and monitor health standards, many of which are related to environmental health.

Bilateral Donor Organizations Active in the Environment Sector

JICA: The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is providing a substantial portion of the support for the National Water Resources Master Plan for 1995-2020, which it helped prepare.

CIDA: The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department for International Development (DfID) currently appear to be the most active in the Zone in terms of the support they provide to the environmental sector. CIDA program intervention assists the Cross River State. The aid is to be disbursed to address problems of rural land and water management, desertification, drought and forest/watershed degradation and climate change. This initiative has a budget of approximately \$10m USD.

In addition, the Canada-Nigeria Strategic Environmental Facility (CNSEF) will receive approximately the same amount. CIDA is also currently supporting two environmental initiatives in Nigeria through its \$100 million (CD) Global Climate Change Program. One of these activities provides funding to NEST to strengthen the capacity of GFRN institutions to comply with the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) requirements. This activity works with federal and local governments as well as the NGO and media communities to raise awareness and focus attention on issues related to climate change.

DfID: Like CIDA, DfID is very active in the South. Following the return to democracy, DfID reactivated their Nigeria program. At this time, DFID looked initially to restart activities that had been suspended during military rule. One such DfID-supported activity was the Community Forestry Project in Cross River State. This environmental activity focused Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and DfID support for improving both community and state management of forest resources. Specifically, the activity focused on building the capacity of 15 communities to rationalize forest management, and worked with the Forestry Commission to reorganize and raise revenue. DfID funding for this initiative is scheduled to expire in this calendar year (2003). Discussions are underway which could lead to CIDA adding this activity to its portfolio of interventions in Cross River State.

Based upon the new DFID Country Strategy, new programming activities will be focused on four states. Discrete activities are still in the planning stages. However, in the environment realm, one likely DFID-funded activity will focus on improved management of the Nguru Wetlands, an internationally recognized Important Bird Area (IBA) and a Ramsar site located in the northeast of Nigeria.

NGO/PVO Interventions

Since 1997 Pro Natura International, in cooperation with BP (now BP-Amoco), Statoil, Shell & TotalFinaElf, has managed an intervention in the coastal community of Akassa home to 30,000 people on the extreme Southern edge of Nigeria

Private Sector Interventions

Over the past decade, the oil industry has become more aggressive in its efforts to address environmental concerns in its areas of operations. These actions fall into the following broad categories: remediation and community involvement. While precise financial details weren't available at the time of the team's fieldwork, estimates for community oriented interventions are said to be in the range of \$40m USD for Shell Oil. Other companies are assumed to have committed comparable sums based upon the value of their operations in the southern region.

Generally, remediation efforts are designed to rehabilitate damaged areas to an environmentally acceptable condition, according to international standards. Community involvement activities range across a spectrum of actions that are familiar to the development community, e.g., microfinance geared especially, but not exclusively to women, cooperating with local institutions in projects with small farmers, job training for employment and providing support to international and local PVOs/NGOs for a number of initiatives.

2.1.3 Environmental Problems in Southern Nigeria: A USAID Role

The USAID Mission in Nigeria has limited resources to commit to the array of environmental concerns in its priority southern States. Indeed, an argument can be made that the number of interveners and the financial assistance that is in the offing from all sources, covers most of the environmental issue space. Nevertheless, we believe that it is important for USAID to be an advocate for sound environmental management in the context of its ongoing economic policy dialogue with the Federal Government of Nigeria. Within the Southern Zone there are distinctions among the constituent States that can help USAID to inform a "rolling" agenda for this process.

USAID has considerable expertise and several ongoing activities in the agricultural sector that may also be used for farm-level environmental protection measures. The focus of this environmental protection-agriculture combination would be on sustainable practices. With regard to the Mission's interest in helping to identify vehicles for improving rural household income generation potential, we believe that the Africa Bureau's Sustainable Development Office might be of some assistance. The SD Office has a program named ASNAPP which may suitably the situation of some of the southern farm families. The program has the added advantage of not imposing an undue burden on Mission management resources.

2.2 Agriculture in Southern Nigeria

USAID/Nigeria recognizes the importance of agriculture to the Nigerian economy and its portfolio reflects a commitment to enhance the performance this sector. In this regard, it supports a number of projects for the development and dissemination of agricultural technologies and cultural practices. Building upon its extensive relationship with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), with a base in Ibadan and a substation in Onne, Rivers State, USAID provides assistance to help Nigerian scientists to strengthen the capacity for biotechnology and increase crop yields, post-harvest storage techniques, disease resistance, and the nutritional quality of the foods grown by the nation's farmers. The Mission also supports the dissemination of research findings on improved varieties of key food and export crops (e.g., bananas/plantain, cocoa, gum arabic, rice, soybeans, cowpeas).

In addition, a farmer-to-farmer program recruits U.S. volunteers in farming and allied agricultural industries who travel to Nigeria to provide direct technical assistance and experience-based advice. There is also an ongoing effort to help farmers to make better-informed decisions through the use radio and print media to disseminate information about agriculture production and marketing conditions.

2.2.1 A Macroeconomic Picture of Agriculture

In macroeconomic terms, agriculture remains the largest and arguably the most important sector and hence the bedrock of the Nigerian economy despite the rise to prominence of the oil sector over the past thirty years. Approximately 65% of Nigerians earn their living from the land. And this sector, its problems notwithstanding, is still the source of approximately 41% of total GDP.

Despite the critical importance of agriculture to the well-being of the population and the economic evolution of the country, the problems of this sector seem almost intractable. The issues and problems confronting the sector, especially since the exploration of crude petroleum in Nigeria in the mid 1970s seem to remain endemic, being compounded by poor demographic and economic features. For example, Nigeria has an estimated population of 120 million, a population growth rate of 3.5%, and growth (at a declining rate) in real GDP (1990-2002) of about 2%, thus, making an average real per capita growth of 0.01%, with inflation rate estimated at about 19%.

While the general picture is not especially encouraging, there has been a marginal increase in the overall level of food production in Nigeria. The CBN annual report and statement of accounts (2001) noted that the output of staple crops rose by 3.5% compared with 3.3% growth in 2000. Cash crop production (principally cassava, maize, millet and sorghum) production rose by 3.4% compared with 3.3% in 2000. Generally, the aggregate index of agricultural production (crops, livestock, fishery and forestry) rose by 3.7% in 2001 compared with 3.1% in 2000 (see Figure 1 in Annex C for details). However, in spite of the apparent improved performance of the sector, the 3.7% growth rate recorded was much lower than the 5.8% annual growth target set in the 2000-2003 National Rolling plan. As shown by the data in the following table, the anemic growth of agricultural production has barely kept pace with the population growth rate.

Table 1: Agricultural Production By Type of Activity

Activity	Av. rate	Quantity/Year								
		1997	1998	Growth rate	1999	Growth rate	2000	Growth rate	2001	Growth rate
Crops	3.4	278.7	288.0	3.3	298.2	3.5	308.0	3.3	318.8	3.5
Livestock	2.1	180.4	181.3	0.5	185.6	2.4	190.7	2.7	195.8	2.7
Fishery	4.2	99.5	105.7	6.2	108.8	2.9	112.9	3.8	117.4	4.0
Forestry	1.5	132.7	133.6	0.7	136.3	2.0	138.4	1.5	140.9	1.8
Aggregate	3.3	235.2	242.4	3.1	250.4	3.3	258.2	3.1	267.7	3.7

Source: CBN Annual Report & Statement of Accounts (2000&2001)

It is generally acknowledged that the growth of the Nigerian oil industry resulted in the diversion of a significant portion of the nation's financial and technical resources to the needs of that sector. In addition, however, as that sector has grown in importance to GDP, a number of structural difficulties in the agricultural sector were worsening as resource inflows declined. Appendix C provides a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of Nigeria's agricultural sector. However, it is important to indicate that this sector is not monolithic. As a result, of varying cultural, ecological and geological characteristics choices for USAID intervention should be informed by an awareness of the differences among the States comprising the region.

2.2.2 Zonal Distinctions in Southern Nigerian Agriculture

There are distinctive social, political and structural issues across the zones that make up southern Nigeria as seen in Table 2. Some of these issues impinge on the potentials and constraints of agriculture in the different zones. For example, the patriarchal system of inheritance and ownership of landed properties predominates in southern Nigeria, especially in the Southeast and the South-South. Women who contribute about 90% of the human resource in agriculture don't have direct rights to land and hence depend on their husbands, sons, and brothers for their farmlands. This limits their access to other productive resources like agricultural loan (credit) and hence investment in their agribusiness. Indeed, culture and various forms of socialization tend to limit women's ability to harness their talents in various spheres of life including agriculture thus they rarely work as owners of the farms.

Pressure on agricultural land permeates the south, but takes different forms. The very high population density of Southeast, the oil and gas pollution of South-South and high degree of urbanization of Southwest has made land a serious political issue in southern Nigeria. Hence, there are constant inter- and intra-state land conflicts. This has also strengthened most of the community-based organizations in this area as they are formed and seen as viable organs for conflict resolution.

Table 2: Zonal Distinctions in Agriculture

Indicator	Southeast	South-South	Southwest
Land Tenure and Ownership	Inherited from father resulting in fragmentation	Inherited from father and shared with other sons, hence fragmented.	Requested from community, family or 'rented'
Major Food Crops	Rice, maize, cassava	Plantains/banana, maize, cassava, rice.	Yams, vegetables, melon seed, cassava
Major Soil and Climate Features	Deep porous sandy loams, strongly acidic with a PH of 5-5.5 on the surface. High rainfall and excessive leaching predisposes the soil to erosion.	Alluvial soil. High rainfall belt susceptible to flood. Endowed with mineral oil and gas deposits, hence susceptible to pollution.	Crystalline acid rocks constitute the parent material of the soil. Chief features include a sandy surface horizon underlain by a weakly developed clayey, mottled, and occasionally concretionary sub-soil. They are generally considered to be of high natural fertility,
Major Cash Crops	Oil palm, Cashew	Oil palm, Natural rubber	Cocoa traditionally, food crops for urban markets
Market Access Issues	Domestic market	Domestic and international market.	Domestic (home and urban) and international markets
Gender Issues	Women perform actual farming tasks; Cannot inherit land; access determined by husband, sons and brothers	Women perform actual farming tasks, cannot inherit land and other tangible assets. Women rarely benefit from agricultural Development Services	Women involved mainly processing and trading of farm commodities; Can demand land from family for farming, but would hire Laborers
Agro Inputs	Depend on family labor and exchange labor.	Heavy reliance on family labor	Large reliance on migrant labor and tractors
Food Security Issues	Form commodity cooperatives, storage of grains and palm produce.	Mobilize savings through CBAs, storage of dried aquatic products.	Cooperative associations and food storage of cocoa and grains.
Health & Welfare Issues	Malaria, onchocerciasis, and HIV/AIDS	Acute decline in available labour due to high incidence of HIV/AIDS	Malaria and onchocerciasis

It is useful to contrast the land pressures in the Southeast and Southwest. Both are fueled by population growth, but the former arises from internal growth, while the latter comes from urban growth and heightened demand for food in urban areas. Traditional land ownership and inheritance patterns in the Southeast led fathers to divide their land holdings among sons until it became apparent that plots were becoming too small to be viable in support of a family. The practice of primogenitor arose, leaving younger sons little option but to go into commerce and industry. This may account for the rapid growth of small-scale industrial production in Onitsha, Aba and surrounding villages. In commerce, one finds for example, that people from the Southeast dominate the trade in patent medicines in the North and much of the south. This push from the land may help explain why in the southeast boys are dropping out of school and trying to go into business, while girls, who never had any claim to land, predominate in secondary education.

The pressure that urbanization puts on the land in the Southwest is not simply a matter of expanding urban land use. These urban markets demand food, and it is the agricultural hinterland in Oyo, Ogun and surrounding States that provides food. As Guyer and Lambin (1993)³ observed in the Ibarapa area of Oyo State, “Largely due to market response, agricultural practice is developing in a dynamic fashion in advance of population pressure on Ruthenberg’s threshold for humid savannah agriculture of four years of cultivation and eight years of fallow.” Food crops had become cash crops in response to the urban Markets of Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan. They found that new cultivation techniques (tractors), greater use of fertilizer and denser planting was occurring for traditional crops like maize, cassava, and melon seed. Traditional cultivation, though with the addition of migrant labor, was being used on ‘new’ crops such as tomatoes, peppers and cucumbers. These were new in the sense of the scale on which they were being grown. New areas for cultivation were being opened up such as valley bottoms, which could support dry season production of vegetables.

2.2.3 Partners in The Agriculture Sector

The sector receives support from a number of bilateral and multilateral assistance organizations. While the programs of assistance have specific objectives, in concert they seek to return Nigeria to self-sufficiency in food production as a general matter. The FGON has sponsored and is still sponsoring various programs on agricultural development. These include Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), Green Revolution, National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP), Agricultural Banks, state-based Agricultural Development Projects (ADP), and River Basin Development Authorities.

The government is collaborating with various donor agencies, e.g. USAID, UNDP, World Bank, IFAD, and UNICEF, in counterpart funding for agriculture. For example, the World Bank assisted Government Rice projects in Enugu and Anambra States. The ADB and UNICEF assisted in water projects in rural farming communities and established strategic grain reserves as a food security measure. These are designated for ten states of the federation, and six are operational, though below capacity.

UNDP sponsored various programs in agriculture e.g. Women in Agriculture (WIA) through the Agricultural Development Projects. The interventions have been found to be successful in bringing women to the fore in agriculture and enhancing their access to improved productive resources. Organized training program in partnership with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) for participating farmers and for youths in the Niger Delta Area.

FAO is collaborating with FGN in funding the Special Food Security Programme. Specifically, FAO is providing technical experts to work on irrigation development, post-harvest technologies and processing activities in Nigeria. Providing a US\$1.3 million trust Fund for the Ministry of Water Resources to undertake an assessment of Dams and river basin resources for possible rehabilitation. FAO

³ Guyer JI and Lambin EF. Land Use in an Urban Hinterland: Ethnography and Remote Sensing in the Study of African Intensification. *American Anthropologist* 1993; 95(4): 839-859.

is also collaborating with UNDP in training the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) staff to strengthen their capacity in the formulation and implementation of agricultural and environmental policies and laws.

DFID is developing programs to address problems involved in the promotion of agricultural exports and commodities and services marketing program.


UNICEF is funding water projects in many states e.g. Cross River. Has thus increased the access of farmers to safe water consumption, thereby reducing the prevalence of water born diseases that deplete and weaken the labor force in agriculture.

NGOs: Some of the better established NGOs such as Concerned Universal in Cross River and ANPEZ Center for Environment and Development in Rivers state are involved in water projects in rural communities and providing access to credit for small farmers, especially women.

Similarly, the collaboration between the New Nigeria Foundation and Citizens International (NNF/CI) provides an example of what can be achieved through cooperative efforts between civil society organizations. This partnership was initiated 2001 with approximately \$2.4 million in funds from the United Nations Foundation which has been leveraged into a funding pool of slightly more than \$10million from a mix of public and private institutions, including global corporations, private foundations, Nigerian state governments and multilateral donors at the beginning of 2003. Its principal activity, The Integrated Sustainability Community Development Program (ISCDP), has been launched in nine states of the Niger Delta region. This integrated approach emphasizes the design and implementation of public – private partnerships that will address the following issues in the region:

- Agricultural competitiveness
- Youth unemployment
- Cooperation development among local governments and communities
- Integrated rural development and revitalization of national parks

While NNF/CI have been initially concerned with community health issues, their project appears to be an intervention model that bears attention. Its structure suggests that it may have the potential to address multiple issues of interest to USAID/Nigeria. It is also possible that some synergy might result from carefully coordinated actions involving NNF/CI, ANPEZ and Concern Universal.



USAID has collaborated with the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) for both agricultural development and child survival. The latter includes work on vitamin supplementation. Work in the south has focused on Oyo, Abia and Cross River States, although future investment may concentrate more in Abia and Cross River. A tree crop project in Cross River State enables joint agriculture and environmental intervention. The choice of IITA as a partner is efficient since IITA has an extensive network of donor input and field outreach as illustrated in the attached chart.

2.2.4 Specific Issues for Strategic Choices

Gender

Studies carried out for UNDP and others suggest that traditional or customary systems that might have protected a woman's access to land during her lifetime are breaking down under population and economic pressures. These pressures contribute to an increase in the movement of rural to urban areas. An important result of this gender specific movement is a rise in the number of women as *de facto* heads of household who lack the authority to make decisions about the use or disposition of their family's land. Formal legal codes and rural customs and traditions are not yet able to address this type of problem. In our view, this is likely to result in exacerbating the existing problem of land fragmentation.

Post-Harvest Losses and Income Enhancement

Women have an important role in maintaining harvested crops for the immediate needs of the family for food and for insuring the quality of any thing destined for the market. It seems appropriate that IITA and the ADPs would increase their efforts to help rural women with appropriate technology and training to improve farming practices in this area. IITA in its current work with the Mission has already taken some small steps in this regard and has achieved some success, including the selection of a woman farmer as "farmer of the year" in one of its programs. This should augur well for a controlled expansion of its mandate and resources to direct greater attention to women in the region's agriculture.

Farm-to-Market Integration

Building on the successes of IITA in promoting improved varieties, especially cassava, donors including USAID, have been discussing the goal of linking farmers to markets, an ostensible aim of the Rural Sector Enhancement Program (RUSEP). Cassava could have industrial use and export value in producing starch, sugar and ethanol. It is true that petroleum companies, who are not major employers themselves, could invest in agro-industries. Unfortunately this is not a new idea, and would need major re-tooling to be viable. Interviews with farmers and food crop processors and traders in the Ibarapa area of Oyo State, a major cassava producing area where over 60% of the local crop is sold to feed Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan. There were reports of a short-lived starch industry located on the highway between Abeokuta and Lagos a few years ago.

More instructive was the experience of Texaco who established and ran a large plantation north of Abeokuta that spanned the Ogun-Oyo State border, overlapping into Ibarapa between 1977 and 1986. New varieties of cassava were obtained from IITA. The factory/plantation provided local employment for both skilled and unskilled workers, and a large number of women were hired in the *gari* processing component. In addition to making *gari* (cassava meal), there was a starch extraction section, and the peelings were used to make animal feed. The intent was to produce cassava meal for an export market, but this did not work out, hence, Texaco began competing on the local market. The operation closed due partly to dispute by the original owners over the land that had been given to Texaco by State authorities and partly to the uncompetitive price of factory produced cassava meal compared to that made by local peasant farming families.

The New Nigeria Foundation is conducting a cassava competitiveness project is seven of its 46 Community Health Services Program sites, primarily in the Niger Delta area. The project is linking at the community level farmers (primarily female), cassava processors, market women, transporters and tool fabricators. IITA is providing seedlings and technical assistance. The Community Development Foundation is managing 'wholesale' credit to local savings cooperatives in the target communities. While these links are more in the area of food production, not industrial use of cassava, it is a model that bears

watching. The important lesson, whether for food or industrial use of agricultural products is that adequate attention needs to be placed on the marketing end.

2.2.5 Comparative Advantage and Perceptions of USAID

Among FGN agricultural professionals USAID is known for its support and extensive collaboration with IITA. They also see it as providing critical assistance in capacity building and in extension, applied policy formulation. However, among the NGOs interviewed the Mission was more closely identified with issues concerning democracy and governance. These organizations also believed USAID to be more involved in health issues than in issues concerning agriculture.

The views of the NGOs should not be construed as a negative, however. USAID's support for civil society in Southern Nigeria suggests that the base for interventions in other areas is in place. In our view this is a resource of significant potential for the realization of the Mission's strategic goals in agriculture.

2.3 Understanding Conflict in Southern Nigeria

Under the umbrella of democracy and governance (D&G), the Mission has identified six interlocking challenges to Nigeria's emerging democracy, 1) social conflicts and civil unrest, 2) constitutional reforms, 3) elections administration, 4) corruption, 5) civil-military relations, and 6) the economy. Proposed USAID assistance over the next five years will address all of these areas in one form or another, with the exception of civil-military relations, which is being addressed by DFID and the U.S. Embassy. These six challenges cut across all the five elements within the scope of the D&G Strategic Objective: 1) consensus (agreement on the basic rules of the political game); 2) inclusion (opportunities for participation by groups and citizens in relevant political institutions and processes); 3) competition (effective balance of political power between the branches and levels of government, civil society and electoral competitors); 4) rule of law (public and private behaviors conform to the rules and laws); and 5) good governance (accountable and effective government that delivers public services).

The Mission reports that USAID/Nigeria's DG program was initiated in 1998 to assist the process of democratic transition in Nigeria and subsequently invested approximately \$3.2 million in conflict management and mitigation activities. Assessments of the DG sector have revealed that USAID's transitional strategy was too ambitious and did not take into account the low capacity of democratic institutions and structures in Nigeria as well social environment for change. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) supported by USAID have played significant roles in setting legislative agendas, managing conflicts and exercising oversight of government at all levels, but without equal attention to the state at its different levels and manifestations (Federal, State, and Local Governments and numerous parastatal economic and policy organizations), CSO effort will fall short of promoting democracy and preventing conflict. Achievement of specific advocacy goals at the national level were hindered by overriding distractions caused by the increased jockeying for political advantage during the uncertain period leading up to the elongated 2003 elections. In fact, the country has not fully recovered from this period of intense political disturbance as witness the 'coup' that temporarily removed the newly elected governor of Anambra State and the fact that Local Council elections have been postponed indefinitely.

Over the past four years USAID/Nigeria has supported post-conflict reconciliation activities; election monitoring training with a special focus on election-related violence; training and sensitization of community and opinion leaders, eminent persons groups, youth and other vulnerable groups, and faith-based organizations in peace building and peaceful coexistence; and conflict early warning. Although progress was made under the Mission's transitional strategy, significant challenges lie ahead. For example, experiences with CSOs, as seen in Annex D3 teach the lesson that empowering CSOs does not guarantee that government will be responsive and inclusive. Using lessons learned, the new strategy will

target selected government institutions and civil society organizations to strengthen their capacity to provide better oversight and service delivery. This new strategy must take cognizance of the central role the state plays in establishing a climate either that protects its citizens from conflict and intervenes in a timely manner to mitigate the effects of conflict, or conversely, that stimulates, sponsors or condones insecurity, conflict and violence.

2.3.1 A Conceptual Basis

Three broad approaches can be taken to understand the nature of conflict in Nigeria. One attempts to categorize conflict by underlying cause. An example of a classification system is the cultural, economic and political domains proposed by Afrobarometer (2002).⁴ A second approach consists of documenting case studies as was done with the recent multi-agency-sponsored Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA, 2002).⁵ The third seeks to identify an underlying or unifying theory that would explain conflict as well as find solutions. It is this third approach that guided the consultants in this assessment, details of which can be found in Annex D1.

Conflict is an inherent aspect of social life, which arises from contradictions in values, interests and power among individuals, groups, institutions and nations. Conflict pervades daily life with varied intensity and consequences, some of which contribute to the progress of society, while others detract. Ideally policy makers should maximize the progressive aspects of conflict and minimize its destructive elements. Since conflict is pervasive and policy is about choices, the tendency has been to focus on conflicts that have the potential of exploding into large-scale violence that could lead to loss of life, population, destruction of social structures, damage to social values and institutions, and ultimately threaten national development, inhibit investment (domestic and foreign), and damage the environment.

Violence alone is not a key for judging the destructive capacity of conflict. For example, border and land conflicts between communities in Nigeria certainly pose a local security problem, but it is the continuing and large scale conflicts over the effects of industrial production, particularly petroleum, and the prevailing unrest over fraudulent elections that are likely to impact most negatively on national unity, democracy, and national economic progress. These are two issues that manifest most acutely in the southern part of the country especially in the densely populated urban areas and oil-rich river deltas. In this light, it is inadequate to base analysis of conflict on a categorization of causes such as social, economic and cultural or local, national and international. This leads to disparate analyses that have no connecting links and defies development of an underlying theory that could aid in conflict resolution.

A more productive perspective must begin from an understanding that sovereignty confers on the state the legal right to resolve conflicts. For this purpose it monopolizes coercive power within the society. The task of conflict analysis, therefore, is to explain why the state has not been able to prevent the emergence of conflicts or resolve them once they have emerged. It is our belief that an answer to this question will provide the connecting link across the causative elements of various conflicts and make it possible to arrive at appropriate strategies.

It is important to recognize that the state in Nigeria, as in other developing countries, is engaged in two not necessarily compatible processes, nation building and development, either of which may create conflict. The former seeks to centralize power within the state, and often spreads fear and terror in the subject population by its autocratic and violent methods, forcing many people to take refuge in primary identity and solidarity groups or to undertake armed resistance and confrontation. The latter tends to destabilize status hierarchies, as well as power hierarchies. It focuses attention on changes in production

⁴ Afro Barometer (2002) Violent Social Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Nigeria. Briefing Paper No. 2.
www.afrobarometer.org

⁵ The Strategic Conflict Assessment was performed by 6 zonal teams and sponsored by USAID, DfID and other donors.

and distribution. In the process it tends to intensify not only the struggle for wealth but also that for power. It subjects people to very painful adjustments.

A close examination of conflicts in Nigeria suggests that the conflict process in the country suffers greatly from (1) state coercive unilateralism and (2) state partisanship. With respect to state coercive unilateralism, the history of the Nigerian state has been characterized by the use of force to implement policies. The expansion of the market is usually accompanied by force as in the enclosure movement in Europe. But thereafter as the ideology of the market takes hold in society force gives way to the rule of law as the instrument for regulating society, and the state rises above private concerns to act as an autonomous entity above social forces, regulating them in a non-partisan way. In Nigeria the ideology of the market has not permeated society due to unequal international exchange and rabid corruption. Consequently, force is still dominant in the affairs of state, the rule of law is underdeveloped and state partisanship is prevalent.

Marshall *et al.* (2001) in their report on conflict did not specify a theory on the role of the state in conflict, but all of their opening “elements” of conflict pointed to state responsibility.⁶ These included marginalization of ethnic minorities by society (the state), military misrule and poor governance, the dominant government role in controlling oil wealth and the economy, and perceived monopolization of government positions and resources by certain sections of the country. Other authors and agencies have gone as far as documenting incidents where government is the perpetrator of conflict and violence.

A potential mediating factor in social conflict, the police force, has become a source of coercion and conflict in Nigeria. The Afrobarometer (2002) expressed concern that “The Obasanjo government has tended to overreact to outbreaks of instability with heavy-handed crackdowns.” Human Rights Watch (2001) agreed that, “Government response to this violence was often itself abusive.” Such responses exacerbate conflict between police and communities who view the former as ineffective, vengeful, corrupt and oppressive.⁷ The BBC (2002) reported that, “Police officers in Nigeria's commercial capital, Lagos, will no longer be issued with firearms until they have worked for five years. The move follows the killings of several civilians since the police launched a crackdown on armed crime - called Operation Fire-for-Fire - earlier this year.”⁸ Human Rights Watch (2001) observed that, “Twelve police stations were burned down,” during riots between the Yoruba and the Hausa in Lagos in 1999-2000. The irony of increased police harassment of the traveling public along the roads of rural Oyo State as a response to a flare up in armed robbers is described in Annex D2.

State Coercive Unilateralism

The situation in the Niger Delta is illustrative. There, the FGN's desire for the profitable mining of petroleum led to policies that were formulated and implemented without any dialogue with the peoples of the area. Instead, dialogue was conducted with the oil companies and imposed on the people. Conflict emerged when the people opposed the implementation of these policies. Such conflict took three forms (1) community against government (2) community against oil company (3) community against community. Often an alliance between the government and the oil company means that an attack on one of them by a community is interpreted as an attack on both of them. Similarly, an attack by the oil company or government against a community is interpreted by the latter as an attack by both of them. In this way the Ogoni crisis, the massacre in Umuechem and Odi and the various attacks on oil flow stations, oil rigs, oil pipelines, oil companies and government troops and other security forces may be understood.

⁶ Marshall *et al.* (2001) Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria. Submitted to USAID and OTI Nigeria, by ARD, Inc. Burlington, VT.

⁷ Human Rights Watch (2001) World Report 2001: Nigeria. Human Rights Developments.
<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/nigeria.html>

⁸ BBC (2002) Nigerian police novices disarmed. Friday, 6 December 2002, 14:28 GMT.

Human Rights Watch found that the people of the Niger-Delta were brutalized by agents of the state (federal) for attempting to raise grievances with oil companies. In some cases, the state security forces threatened, beat and jailed members of community delegations even before they presented their cases. Many local people were repressed simply for putting forth an interpretation of a compensation agreement, or for seeking effective compensation for land ruined, or livelihood lost as a result of the operations of the oil companies (Human Rights Watch, 1999:2). Under these conditions of severe state repression, coupled with the havoc done to the environment and means of livelihood of the people, local resistance was crystallized against the state. The Ogoni led the way.

Initially this resistance took the forms of demonstrations, petitions to the authorities, the declaration of a Bill of Rights and the conscientization of the Ogoni people. Afraid that the Ogoni resistance would spread to other oil-producing communities, the state responded with further repression. Government began a systematic harassment of Ogoni leaders through arrests, detention, surveillance and divisive manipulations. Secondly, the government encouraged violent conflicts between the Ogoni and their neighbors, which they blamed on the Ogoni and used as a pretext for repressing them. For example, between July 1993 and April 1994, there were at least three violent conflicts between the Ogoni and their neighbors, involving the destruction of many villages, loss of lives and the creation of displaced persons. In each case the security forces blamed the Ogoni and subsequently embarked on extra-judicial killings, floggings, torture, rape, looting and extortion of the Ogoni (Ibeanu, 1997:19).⁹

Finally, the state sought to set members of the Ogoni community against themselves. The obvious target was the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) the popular Ogoni rights movement. The result was the death of four prominent pro-government Ogoni politicians and the execution of nine MOSOP activists, including the MOSOP leader Ken Saro Wiwa after a Kangaroo trial. Ogoni resistance has correspondingly escalated to the stopping of oil production in the area, attacks against flow stations and sabotage of oil installations. The Ogoni experience has since been repeated elsewhere in the Niger Delta as described in Annex D1, most notably of recent among the Ijaw, the largest ethnic group in the delta.

These violent conflicts between the ethnic minorities of the oil producing areas on the one hand and the state and oil companies on the other have persisted. They attained notoriety with the Odi massacre of late November 1999. The task force charged with protecting oil pipelines continually came into conflict with Ijaw youths agitating against the state and the oil companies. It engaged in indiscriminate actions in its search for those vandalizing pipelines, stealing petroleum products and otherwise harassing the oil companies. It carried out extra-judicial killings in the delta. In the course of their resistance the Ijaw youth killed some policemen and seized a few others. The Nigerian troops moved into Odi in search of these missing policemen, and engaged in a brief exchange of fire with a handful of young people. They then proceeded to raze the town. The troops demolished virtually every building and killed dozens of unarmed civilians. Nevertheless, the resistance continued. In September, 2000 President Obasanjo again threatened to deploy the army across the delta (Human Rights Watch, 2001). But the resistance has continued with attacks on oil companies, oil flow stations, oilrigs and oil vessels. Women have even joined the resistance using strategies and tactics peculiar to their gender.

State Domination and Partisanship

Scientific analysis indicates that an important causative factor in Nigerian conflicts is political domination or the fear of it. Political domination arises within the contest of competition for political space by individuals, groups or institutions. It is a phenomenon in which one of the contending actors is able to limit the political space of the other and, therefore, to enjoy disproportionately the benefits of political life. When this limitation of political space is achieved, political domination comes into being,


⁹ Ibeanu, O. (1997). Oil Conflict and Security in Rural Nigeria: Issues in the Ogoni Crisis. AAPS Occasional Paper Series, Vol.1, No.2.

and exerts a negative impact on relations between the contending units, which may degenerate into political violence. The critical factor is the degree to which public policy incorporates all contending actors into the political process on the basis of dialogue, equity, justice and fair play. This is a question of democracy.

As a public policy, the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections alienated many sections of the country but most particularly the Yoruba of the Southwest zone. It prevented a Yoruba, Moshood Abiola from ascending to the presidency. They perceived it as a policy that intended to ensure the continued domination of the Nigerian political space by Hausa Fulani politicians. The detention of Abiola, the winner of that election, was interpreted in southern Nigeria as Hausa-Fulani domination of the country. The Yoruba embarked on a political struggle which occasionally flared into violence but which was essentially political. However, it had all the potential for causing a serious conflagration and breaking up the country. There was talk of an Oduduwa nation being carved out of Nigeria, if necessary by force.

It was in the course of this struggle that the O'dua People's Congress (OPC) was born as a militant wing of some sorts with the objective of ensuring an adequate living space for the Yoruba people either within Nigeria or outside it. The OPC has continued to exist despite the assumption of power by a Yoruba (Obasanjo) and in spite of the harassment of the Police and other security agencies intent on liquidating it. It plays a crucial aggressive/ defensive role in all conflicts involving the Yoruba and other ethnic groups in the southwest zone and elsewhere in the country.

Figure: Support for National Unity by Zone



Partisanship by government may offer an explanation of the North-South dichotomy in these survey results from Afrobarometer (2002)

In the Southeast, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) is the Igbo equivalent of the OPC. It aspires to end the domination of the Igbo ethnic group in Nigerian political life, and thus, hearkens back to the secessionist state of Biafra. This association with a secessionist past has made it a target of continuous harassment by the police and other security agencies. For the same reason Igbo politicians have not embraced it in the same way Yoruba politicians have embraced the OPC. Therefore, not only are there running battles between the Police and MASSOB

activists, there are also rifts and even violent conflicts between these activists and Igbo government officials and authorities. However, as the socio-economic situation degenerates there is every possibility that the activities of MASSOB will become more and more attractive to the Igbo masses and then politicians. This will make secession once more attractive to the Igbo people. Like the struggle of the OPC, the struggle of MASSOB created a clear potential for a very dangerous conflict.

A group of violent conflicts may only be fully understood when the partisanship of the state in conflict resolution prior to the outbreak of violence is properly situated. Usually when a conflict surfaces there is an effort made to resolve it, first within the traditional political system and failing that with the intervention of the state but without involving the courts. Partisanship in the course of this intervention either on the part of the traditional or by the modern state usually hardens attitudes, foreclosing dialogue as an instrument of conflict resolution. Violence is left as the only alternative. Among such conflicts are border disputes, land disputes and cultural disputes.

Community border disputes have been numerous within and between States including Enugu, Abia, Ebonyi and Anambra in the Southeast, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River and Edo in the South-South and Benue State in the North Central Zone, which borders several of the aforementioned states. Details are found in Annex D. Many have resulted in loss of life and destruction of property. Some have arisen over land that would accrue compensation from the oil companies.

The almost continual creation (actually subdivision) of local governments (now numbering over 700) was portrayed as a way of reducing conflict because such entities were supposed to allow greater political participation self-governance by more ethnic subdivisions, communities and clans. In fact this has had several anti-democratic and conflict-promoting results. Since most local governments are too small to be economically viable, they depend on federal subventions. Conflict arises over efforts to secure control over those resources and the power or patronage that comes with attaining local government office. The creation of more local governments also feeds the demand and desire for even more and set subgroups against each other. When new local governments are not forthcoming, the location of a local government headquarters in a town favorable to one of many contenting parties is grounds for raising the conflict to more violent levels as happened in Akoko Southwest in Ondo State, Ide East in Osun State, and Warri in Delta State.

2.3.2 Zonal Distinctions

In the south, the new strategic plan for USAID D&G will focus on conflict, advocacy and constituency development in Edo, Rivers, and Delta States. Even though the primary focus is therefore, on the South-South, the D&G team will be open to democracy promotion and conflict resolution activities that will facilitate intervention by the other three Strategic Objective teams wherever they are working. Thus, awareness of the character of conflict in the other zones is important.

The south does not suffer as much from the stark inter-ethnic conflicts seen in the North. This is due in part to the fact that the Southwest and Southeast are mono-ethnic in character. The more proximate determinates of conflict in these zones include matters such as chieftaincy succession and land disputes respectively. Although the South-South is ethnically diverse, issues associated with oil exploration often overshadow differences that run along ethnic lines.

The Southeast

The most significant conflict is that associated with MASSOB. It has the potential of propelling the people of the area into serious contradiction and violence with the federal government and generating another secessionist war.

Next in importance is the conflict arising from political godfatherism. It generated tension and hostility in the political dispensations of Governor Nnamani in Enugu State and Mbadinuju in Anambra State 1999-2003. Today Anambra state is facing tension, distraction and disorientation arising from the poisoned relations between the Governor and his political sponsors.

More pervasive than the MASSOB and godfather problems in the zone are the border and land disputes. In fact, the two types of disputes are related because in the final analysis border disputes are about the gain or loss of land. However, the potential for wide-scale violence of this genre of conflicts is not high because of their very local nature. There is no coordination of these conflicts and, therefore, the number of people involved in each one of them is quite low. None can mobilize the people on a breadth and depth that is likely to threaten national unity or damage democracy. But they threaten internal security by the opportunity they provide for the spread of small arms and light weapons.

The South-South

This zone is today the violent conflict maze of the country. There is virtually no community in the Niger Delta today that has not recorded one form of crisis or the other. These include the Warri crises; the Oluasiri/Elem Sangama/Soku crises; the Eleme/Okrika crises; the Odi crisis; Ogoni crises etc. What is significant is that these crises are directly or indirectly associated with oil production, the most important activity in the country. Therefore, they have the potential of damaging this activity and ruining the economy. It also has the potential of damaging national unity because of the linkage of these conflicts with the demand of ethnic minorities in the area for resource control. Such demand can easily escalate into one for secession and self-determination.

Furthermore this is the zone where violent conflict between state and local community is most direct and clear-cut. The tendency for the state to align with oil companies against the people undermines the legitimacy of the state. It is also the only zone where the local community is pitted against private economic enterprises, notably the oil companies. As a result the activities of the communities are periodically disrupted, making it difficult to attract foreign investment into the country.

Southwest

The southwest zone is the only zone in the southern part of Nigeria where the problem of indigene versus non-indigene has reared its ugly head. This has been the fallout from the June 12, 1993 political crisis that gave birth to the OPC. However, the scale of the problem is not such as to seriously threaten national unity or undermine democracy. Its implications are limited to threats to personal security, as well as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The zone is also more notorious for conflicts associated with succession to traditional ruling stools. The Ife-Modakeke crisis also involves the demand by the Modakeke to participate in choosing the Ooni of Ife, including from its own community. Historically the zone has a much longer tradition of monarchical rule than the other zones in the South. In addition, the domain ruled by these monarchs is wider and more prosperous than that of their counterparts in the South. Therefore, monarchical power is formidable and competition for monarchical power is more intense than in the adjoining zones. But there are conflicts in these other zones associated with struggle for chieftaincy and traditional rulership.

2.3.3 Systemic Problems

As explained above, future interventions must work with CSOs and the state in tandem in order to consolidate democratic gains and prevent conflict. The question in Nigeria arises, "What is the State." With a constitutional system that recognizes discrete roles and responsibilities for the Federal, the 36

Ajegunle Community Partners for Health Prevent Conflict

Ajegunle, a densely populated low-income urban community in Lagos has been known pejoratively as "the jungle." Now residents claim it is "the jolly city." BASICS I established the 16 Community Partners for Health (CPH) coalitions in three urban centers between 1994-2001 for community action and advocacy for health and development. Some of the CPH experiences are outlined in Annex D3. A visit to the Ajegunle CPH in 2003 found not only that the CPH was still functioning, but also had expanded.

The CPH secretary described the situation before. "Ajegunle is the poorest and highly populated mostly with youth. Our children were not empowered to go to school. These youths are easily used as agent of stabilization in this community. Most of these youth don't have anything doing and thus politician use them mostly as agent of conflict." Another member was happy to report that, "Now things are changing. We have not had a communal clash in some time. Even with the recent national strike there was no trouble, no killings here like in Yaba, Mushin and Iyanapaja. We are now peace-loving."

A youth leader explained how they prevented conflict, "By bringing children together during holidays we reduce problems. We trained our youth as artists and on a life career. We work with the parents to guide their children. If they have something to do they will not cause trouble. We also created a sort of library where youth can read. I am now a peacemaker. We know how to channel the talents of our youth." Another young member added, "We organized a center where we taught youth on holidays to keep them busy. We taught them vocational training on things like video coverage and doing write-ups. They have become a useful."

State and over 700 Local Governments there is bound to be some confusion over which incarnation of the 'state' has influence over which aspects of conflict prevention, resolution and unfortunately, even instigation. The fact that the number of sub-national entities has increased drastically since independence (over 10 times for states and 3-4 times for local governments) is in itself a lesson in state control. Possibly two or three states with major industrial bases now have the economic capacity to cover their basic recurrent costs. This puts states in a too weak a position to assert power or provide services. It is telling that in a country as large as Nigeria, the police force is a national agency.

The role and authority of local government, which is touted as that level of government closest to and most responsive to the people, has varied considerably. During the Babangida regime the states were shunned as being ineffectual, and technical and financial resources of the federal government were focused directly on the local governments. Abacha too, in trying to create a power base at the beginning of an aborted transition period, played up to the LGA officials through salary raises and frequent trips to Abuja. At present local government has been left out of the 2003 election process, a move that is said to be needed until local government reform can be enacted constitutionally. This undemocratic delay is supposedly justified by the gross inefficiency, waste and corruption of local government as it evolved under previous regimes. The underlying lesson is that local government, whether in or out of favor with a particular regime, is simply being manipulated for federal ends, and thus, that level of government in which citizens could most easily participate lacks legitimacy.

All State and LGAs rely in large part of annual Federal subventions, gleaned from oil profits.¹⁰ The Federal subvention allocation parameters are in flux again as this is being written, but the basic dependence on the source of this money does not change. As the number of sub-national entities increases, their individual ability to be economically viable decreases. Urban LGAs in Lagos State may raise up to 50% of their income from local levies, rents and licenses, while rural ones may be 95% dependent on Federal largesse.

The local tax base is definitely something that the state has not addressed adequately in Nigeria,¹¹ and while elected and appointed state and local officials fight over the meager federal funds available, the citizenry has few expectations and goes about its own business under the belief of "government money for government people." In addition to not being able to hold LGAs fiscally accountable, neither can the citizens hold LGA agency staff accountable for the services they provide or fail to deliver. In an ironic twist, all senior technical and management staff in a local government actually are employed by a state level Local Government Service Commission. Local governments themselves are not stable and are frequently dissolved by state governors and federal officials. Such dissolution is often the result of political conflict. These factors contribute to the alienation of the public from those branches of government that are closest to them, while guaranteeing tighter federal control.

In addition to holding government accountable at different levels, one must also consider all the money flowing into parastatal organizations from government and donor sources. A case in point is the Niger Delta Development Corporation (NDDC). As seen in the box below, NDDC was set up in response to conflict in the Delta. The question that needs to be raised is not only does this funding ultimately help develop the zone, but does it enable local people to find a free political voice in their own development?

¹⁰ Ekpo AH and Ndebbio JEU. Local Government Fiscal Operations in Nigeria. African Economic Research Consortium Research paper No. 73, Nairobi, 1998.

¹¹ Guyer JJ, Representation without taxation: an essay on democracy in rural Nigeria, 1952-1990. African Studies review 1992; 35(1): 41-79.

Does the NNDC offer help, distraction, or appeasement?	
The case of the Ogoni	
Official perspective in investment	Money spent, but what do the locals think?
<p>No fewer than 3053 Ogoni patients have benefited from the free health care services “of the Niger Delta Development Commission, which took place at Bori, Ogoniland in Rivers State recently. These facts were contained in a report by a non governmental organisation, Family Care Association, which was published recently:</p> <p>According to the Family Care Association report, “a team of 65 national and expatriate volunteer from various fields Joined together to make the project a reality by providing free as well as quality healthcare in Ogoniland.” Thousands of prescribed drugs were also dispensed daily; while the medical team, undertook numerous surgical cases and Villagers presented themselves at the project site daily for urgent and long over due operations.”</p> <p>Mr. Ndutimi Alaibe, Executive Director Finance & Administration, NNDC, who attended the opening ceremony of the project, assured all the states in the Niger Delta region of similar programmes, which he said was aimed at ensuring that the indigenes are healthy. For each project, more than 3,000 patients benefited. The health programme, is designed to benefit between 3,500- 4,000 patients in areas of free consultation, drugs nutritional supplements, dental procedures, surgical procedures/operations, ophthalmic procedures, Aids/HIV /STI awareness, lectures and seminars.</p>	<p>The protests of Niger Delta residents have led to some action on the part of the government and the oil companies. In December 2001, President Olusegun Obasanjo set up the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to diffuse the feeling that the region's oil wealth was being used for other parts of Nigeria.</p> <p>In two years, it has spent some 4bn naira (\$28m) building schools, health centres and roads and bringing electricity and piped water to communities across the region. Half of the funding comes from multinational oil companies and half from the federal government.</p> <p>The NDDC is also training young people in everything from carpentry to computer literacy to collecting rubbish and setting up transport firms "to distract their attention away from violent tendencies" as NDDC head of corporate affairs Anietie Usen put it.</p> <p>The NDDC is also thinking long-term and mapping out the region's infrastructure, so that new projects are built where they are most needed, not just in response to the latest protest by a particular community.</p> <p>NDDC managing director Godwin Omene told BBC News Online that in this respect, the Niger Delta was "trail-blazing" for the rest of Nigeria.</p> <p>But the Ogoni people are not impressed. "We have not yet felt the impact of the NDDC," says Levi Lenee.</p>
Posted: April 07, 2003 At 23:02:51: Nigerian Time Niger Delta Development Commission 6 Olumeni Street GRA, Port Harcourt, Nigeria	Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/2949809.stm Published: 2003/04/15 13:01:39 GMT

2.3.4 Future Directions

It would be the ultimate irony if the help rendered by USAID that enabled the federal government to become more aware of the need for accountability in budgeting and spending not only fostered the insight that state and local governments also need such controls, but also led to the virtual suspension of democratic local government in the country. The immediate future of local government is being run by appointed councilors hand selected by state governors, a majority of whom are from the political party that controls the federal government. Such moves increase the sense of alienation that is particularly poignant in the southern part of the country. This could have the effect of rendering ineffectual the history of efforts put into strengthening CSOs toward action and advocacy at the local level, since appointed officials are accountable to the party, not the electorate. Change under these circumstances will be possible only when local CSOs work together under broader umbrella NGO coalitions to bring their advocacy concerns to higher levels of government.

The challenge to USAID is to find appropriate forums that bring stakeholders and intended beneficiaries of policies into dialogue with policy makers before, during and after policy formulation and implementation. The Policy Project has some experience bringing together stakeholders in developing a draft revision of the national population policy. These efforts nearly unraveled due to high level lobbying by the National Population Commission, which could have led to undemocratic decrees from he

presidency, which in turn would undermine the consultative process. These experiences not only demonstrate that unilateralism persists in a democratic era, but that USAID's attention is still needed at the federal level to bring about a culture, not only of financial accountability but democratic accountability.

Work with CSOs should continue, and the value of indigenous problem solving bodies such as town unions and development societies, which permeate the south, should be recognized. Work in other strategic objective sectors should be integrated such as community problem solving processes inherent in the Promoting Sexual and Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS Prevention (PSRHH) pilot communities, the BASICS CPHs and CAPAs and LEAP's PTA involvement, to name a few. These efforts have demonstrated the process of building community coalitions, but as mentioned, such coalitions need to believe that their advocacy efforts will bear fruit and not be turned aside or vetoed by federal level decrees. A two-pronged approach that involves CSO strengthening as well as federal responsiveness and inclusiveness is needed. Focal issues such as HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation can be used to model this dual approach, bringing CSO coalitions and federal policy makers into dialogue.

A final word is needed concerning the MASSOBs and OPCs, which in many ways are the embodiment of southern feelings that the federal government is incapable of looking after their interests and needs. The positive energies of these groups could be channeled to nation building if only their constituents felt that they could have a voice in non-partisan national policy. A USAID role that goes beyond simple peacemaker may be needed. Donors should not serve federal tendencies toward unilateralism by co-opting civil society, but ensure that true dialogue ensues. In the process, donors should also ensure that independent monitoring is in place through organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

2.4 Unemployment, Workforce Development and Economic Opportunity in Southern Nigeria

2.4.1 Unemployment

Accurate employment and unemployment statistics in Nigeria are elusive. Official unemployment figures are in the single digit range, 4.0% for 2000 and 3.8% for 2001. This contrasts starkly with the 1999 NDHS (2000) wherein 50% of women reported that they had not been employed in the previous 12 months, and 23% of men were not currently employed.

Formal reports depict unemployment as a distinctly southern phenomenon, as can be seen in Annex E. All states listed on the NigerianCV (2002) website as being among the top ten in unemployment rates for August through October 2002 were in the south as seen in Table 1. This may be linked to two characteristics that distinguish the southern states, greater levels of education and urbanization. Education creates expectations for certain types of employment (clerical, academic, professional) that are less available generally, and especially in rural areas. A Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) survey found that the bulk of unemployed were secondary school leavers accounting for 61.1 percent of urban unemployment and 39 percent of rural unemployment (Chimezie, 2003).

Table 1: Percent Unemployment by State Aug-Oct 2002					
Zone and State					
South-South		Southeast		Southwest	
Akwa Ibom	*	Abia	3.5	Ekiti	*
Bayelsa	*	Anambra	3.5	Lagos	28.4
Cross River	*	Imo	4.4	Ogun	7.4
Delta	6.9	Ebonyi	*	Ondo	3.7
Edo	4.2	Enugu	*	Osun	5.1
Rivers	3.6			Oyo	6.4
*Not listed in top 10 during period (assumed < 3.5%)					
Source: http://www.nigeriancv.com/statistics.htm					

percent lived in the rural areas (Chimezie). Lagos State, the most urbanized and a great economic magnet for the country, not surprisingly has the largest unemployment rates in the country by a magnitude of 4-6 times that of other states. Notably, the southwestern zone has the greatest proportion of states (5 of 6) that fall in the top ten on the unemployment list (NigerianCV, 2002).

Education and employment have distinct gender and regional characteristics. The NDHS (2000) reports rates of illiteracy among adults in the south to be between 11-20% for women and 7-10% for men compared with 77-82% and 50-59% respectively in the north. Concerning employment, the 1999 NDHS reports that between 30% and 40% of women in the south had not been employed in the past year compared with 78% in the north. The proportion of men who reported that they currently had no job were around 30% in the south compared to approximately 10% in the north. It should also be noted that when women are employed, they are more likely to be in the informal economy, e.g. traders, and when in the formal economy, they are more likely to hold auxiliary, clerical and paraprofessional positions as opposed to managerial, executive and professional roles.

2.4.2 Zonal Issues

A description of the zonal characteristics of unemployment in the south follows. In the Southwest Zone large urban centers like Lagos and Ibadan have been fertile grounds for unemployed militant youth activism, thus creating a links among unemployment, urbanization and conflict. Lagos had a high official unemployment rate of 10.9 per cent in 1995; this is 8.4 percentage points over the national average estimate of 2.5% for that year.

In Anambra and Enugu States of Southeast Zone, the unemployment rate increased rapidly from 2.0 percent in 1994 to 7.0 percent in 1996. It is instructive to mention that this zone is also generally a home for traders and artisans who are not necessarily viewed as unemployed in a formal sense. These occupations may however, mask massive underemployment or disguise unemployment in a structural sense.

The industrial structure of the Southeast and Southwest Zones differ and may explain differences in employment. The Southeast is characterized largely by small-businesses, trading and other informal sector economic activities, which provide a cushion or stabilizing effect on employment pressures. In contrast, the Southwest, especially Lagos has large and medium-size industrial organizations. When these experience dramatic employment changes when industries shift, close or downsize the region is affected. Even though there is also a manifest informal sector economic sector of considerable volume in the Southwest, for instance in Ibadan, these businesses are often not enough to absorb unemployment problems caused by large-scale industry dislocations.

Education may prompt rural-to-urban migration, thus concentrating the pool of unemployed in urban areas, especially in the south. Central Bank of Nigeria statistics for 1997 show that urban unemployment (8.5%) is more than double that of rural areas (3.7%), but this disguises the fact that the bulk of unemployed people live in cities. A survey by the FOS in June 1985 showed that 97 percent of the unemployed people in Nigeria were in the urban areas, while 3

The structure of the industrial sector does not favor current expansion of employment opportunities. The low output growth in industries does not stimulate the employment growth especially due to the choice of techniques in the manufacturing industries where there is more or less fixed factor proportions in the production process in the private sector of the economy between labor and capital. As a result when output of industries expand, labor input employment may not expand correspondingly because of company's desire for higher profitability. In addition, with capacity utilization very low (less than 30% in 2001) in the manufacturing sector, their labor employment capacity is highly constrained even within the fixed factor proportions condition.

The South-South Zone presents a special case. The zone is well known for its oil production where the bulk (80 per cent) of government revenue is generated. It has the highest concentration of the foreign oil producing companies and therefore, of high local-expatriate personnel mix in the oil industry's employment profiles. The income and life style of the relatively small oil workforce prices are generally very high and therefore, put pressure on prices of goods and services in the Zone. In addition to raising the cost of living in the Zone, the work of the oil companies has other negative effects on employment. Displacements of labor, especially youth, from traditional agricultural settings because of environmental changes and damage (oil spills, gas flaring) have disrupted fishing and farming have fueled the unemployment of youths in that area. Other factors driving people from traditional agricultural employment include land fragmentation due to inheritance customs and erosion.

Given the known high capital-intensive production process in the oil producing industry, the labor-capital ratio is definitely low. Therefore, the labor employment capacity of the industry which also dominates economic activities in the region is consequently low. Besides, it has been established that the industrial activities of the oil production has low real integrative capacity with the local economy and workforce. There is low capacity in the workforce development, and because of low or no technical skills among the youth in the Zone their employability is low. In most cases, personnel from outside the region fill high-skilled jobs. In recent times, however, the companies in the petroleum industry have begun to engage in "socially responsible" activities, for example by providing educational programs for the indigenes of the region.


The South-South Zone has a high unemployment rate according to official records. In 1996, the figure was estimated at 23 per cent in Edo/Delta, and 4.2 per cent and 2.7 per cent in Rivers and Cross-River States respectively. The unemployed population is generally the youths in the age cohort of 15-24 years.

Evidence from a survey of unemployed persons carried out in September 2002, by the Cross River State Government revealed that the majority in the Calabar metropolis were secondary school leavers, that is, holders of senior secondary school certificates. This category accounted for a two-thirds (66.7 per cent) of a total of the 8164 surveyed. Another 23.4% had post-secondary qualifications (Ordinary and Higher National Diplomas from Polytechnics, National Certificates of Education, and University degrees). It is however estimated conservatively that the total number of unemployed in the Cross River State in 2002 was 24,000.

In a similar survey of unemployed people in Rivers state by May 2002, the total number of registered unemployed indigenes of the state was 34,845. Out of this figure, university graduates comprised 24.9 per cent. Non-graduates accounted for the majority with a total number of 26,186 or 75.1 per cent. The local government area mostly affected was the Onne Local Government Area, which accounted for 7.1 per cent out of the 23 LGAs.

2.4.3 Poverty and Workforce Development

One naturally assumes that there is a connection between unemployment and poverty. Ironically, poverty is greater in the North, while unemployment is higher in the South as seen in the Figure (Aigbokhan, 2000). Not only is poverty greater in the North, but it also increased over the more than a decade as represented in the figure. Poverty increased and then decreased in the South. Still, one should not be complacent with southern poverty rates over 30%. Within the South poverty is greatest in the South-South zone, where employment, agricultural, HIV, environmental and social conflict problems merge.



Percent Living in Poverty by Zone and Year

It is important to be aware of the existing forms of workforce development before proposing new interventions. The indigenous institution of apprenticeship through trade guilds is still widely practiced. Apprentices gain their freedom (graduation) after a period of service and with the full approval of not just the master craftsman, but guild in that community. Apprentices are often drawn from the 30% (urban) to 60% (rural) of secondary school aged children who do not attend school. In addition, some who complete secondary school and are not too proud to learn and practice handwork undertake apprenticeship programs. These older apprentices generally complete their training in a shorter time period since they are physically more able to master and carry out the hard work required.

Similar trades can also be learned through the formal system of Technical Colleges that are supposed to fit into the secondary education system as something like a technical senior high school track. In reality, many students are youth who have finished at a regular high school, cannot find employment and go back to the Technical College to gain skills. At the post-secondary level there are Polytechnics.

The Chief Economic Adviser to the President, Dr. Magnus Kpakol, has said that the nation needed 3 million jobs annually, to free itself from the current unemployment crisis. "Estimates show that Nigeria requires about 3 million jobs annually to pull the economy out of prolonged unemployment and poverty traps in which the country is trying to escape from," he said in an address read on his behalf by his special assistant, Alh Mohammed Aliyu. Dr. Kpakol expressed the readiness of the Federal Government to tackle unemployment and poverty, head-on. "Unemployment and poverty are twin phenomena", he pointed out adding, "the process of employment creation and poverty reduction must at all times be considered jointly and simultaneously."

Emma Ujah

The Vanguard

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Adolescent Employment in Oyo State

Annex E contains a case study outlining the fact that people as young as 10 years are part of the workforce or in search of employment since between 30% (urban) and 60% (rural) of secondary school aged children are not in school. Over 70% of these out-of-school adolescents are currently working as apprentices, while 13% are unemployed. Unemployment is associated with being below 15 years of age, living in an urban area, having no formal education, and being female. The 10-14 year age group, while part of Nigeria's workforce, is not captured in official employment statistics. Their educational and training needs cannot be ignored.

USAID has been involved in workforce development in an additional type of training institute, the Training Center. These are run primarily as private urban institutes in the south and as government-sponsored centers in the north. Opportunities Industrialization Center International (OICI) specifically has been working with a national counterpart, NOIC training youth in Warri, Delta State and in Lagos. A major lesson learned from that experience is that youth can learn new skills, but that job placement is still not guaranteed. This raises the issue of what employment options actually exist, especially in light of the large unemployment figures cited previously.

2.4.4 Economic Opportunity

Economic opportunity, particularly jobs, can come in at least three major forms, private sector employment, self-employment (entrepreneurship), and government employment. Private sector capacity for generating employment is limited as mentioned above. Although public sector employment is large, it does not comprise as high a proportion of the workforce as in other African countries. Therefore, at present, the bulk of economic opportunity rests on individual entrepreneurship, which often falls within the informal economy.

A positive development in the private sector has occurred since 2001, in the areas of information technology (IT) of the Global System of Mobile (GSM) telecommunications, and is especially visible in urban centers like Lagos. This has generated significant employment opportunities for young highly skilled Nigerians as well as young unskilled and low-skilled men and women who sell recharge cards along the roadside, although the latter are definitely under-employed. The employment development effects of this private sector enterprise have also strongly demonstrated the dynamics of the sector, if the policy environment is friendly and reinforcing to their operations. The strategic value of the technical and scientific knowledge and skills of young people have been strengthened by this new technological and product.

Efforts of the Federal Government (FGON) to stem the explosive effects of unemployment and thereby expand the workforce are contained in many National Development Plans and recently in such programs as the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and National Poverty Eradication Program (NAPEP). The thrust of NDE intervention is the creation of additional skills in the graduates in order to enable them to enter into the workforce effectively. This could either be as private entrepreneurs or in paid jobs in the public and private sectors. In reality, the emphasis however is the entrepreneurship category. State level efforts in Cross River and Rivers are described in Annex E, and are similar in their focus on entrepreneurship. Government also has a long history of providing agricultural credit to farmers, but often with poor returns.

The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) created by the current government has some potential for employment generation, even though its main focus is currently on infrastructure development. NDDC operates in nine states in the southern part of Nigeria and engage largely on public works such as roads, water, bridges, etc. This by itself has employment effects (probably of Keynesian public works effect) although such workers may be largely artisans and operate over a medium term.

One fundamental fact from the analysis of the interventions is that they have not sufficiently arrested the unemployment situation nor have enhanced considerably workforce development. It could have been worse however, without the intervention. The capacity-building rate of the public sector is

generally lower than that of the private sector. Government policies, especially in the NDE and NAPEP initiatives, seem not to be seriously addressing the inadequate skill challenges facing the youthful graduates. And even where training of the youths is accomplished for micro-enterprise operations and self-reliant ventures, the trained youths were not empowered either by means of soft loans, equipments and necessary tools to go into actual operations. No start-up capital is provided. This is also true of state governments' initiatives.

2.4.5 Microfinance and Microcredit

Self-employment and entrepreneurship depends on one's ability to raise capital. A clear example is the case of a young person who has finished an apprenticeship or a course at a Technical College and needs to buy equipment and rent a shop to start in business. In the Southwest, for example, there are seven community-based sources of credit. Four of these are indigenous institutions, 1) the contribution club, 2) daily contribution schemes, 3) hire purchase, and 4) money lenders. Three credit sources are formal institutions that are linked with major banks, 1) savings and thrift cooperatives, 2) community banks and 3) the People's Bank. The latter two are national programs.

The Cooperative movement is unique to states in the former Western Region, which includes the whole Southwest Zone plus Edo and Delta States. There is a Cooperatives Department in the various State Ministries of Finance with staff that provide technical and auditing assistance. The strength of these existing institutions is that they draw on local resources and rely on local social sanctions to guarantee repayment. The limitation for the populations of most concern, youth and women, is that one is required to have some capital, collateral or guarantors in order to participate.

The Worldwide Inventory of Microfinance Institutions compiled in 1995 lists 14 Nigerian organizations (<http://www.gdrc.org/icm/network/contlst.htm>). Eight of these are NGOs based in Oyo, Ondo, Imo, Edo, Lagos and Enugu States. Four are national in Nature and only one is in the north (Bauchi). A major NGO involved in the wholesale component of microfinance is the Community Development Foundation (CDF), based in Lagos.

CDF was established 10 years ago to promote entrepreneurial potential throughout the country through microfinance. To date 101 major projects have been undertaken. Primary sponsors are the Ford Foundation and the German NGO, Church Development Service (EED). Specific loan and training projects have been handled for Agip Oil, GTZ, DfID, Nigeria Liquified Natural Gas Company, Ltd. (NLNG), and UNDP, and negotiations are underway for work with the government's Poverty Alleviation Program. CDF has worked in 22 States, most of which are in the south. The ₦500m NLNG project involves 110 communities in the region of the gas production and pipelines with an emphasis on increasing cassava production. Ford support after 10 years is likely to phase out. CFD is managing the agricultural microfinance project for the New Nigeria Foundation in seven communities.

CDF staff have observed different savings and loan behaviors across the region. Repayment rates overall are over 95%, but in the South-South it is 88%. The lower rate in the south was attributed to "reparation syndrome" but is improving over time. Examples of other unique settings and circumstances include the attitude of people in Ekiti State for avoiding disgrace. On the positive side this exerts pressure on borrowers to repay their loans. The story of one cooperative official who diverted the group's funds was narrated. After his actions were exposed, his father literally died of shame. Another interesting group is butchers. Their propensity to repay loans is tied in with oaths they swear on knives and blood when they join this vocation. Overall, the uptake of loans in the southwest may be more due to historical interest, but Igbo groups, whether living in the southeast or not, were thought to be more conscientious about ensuring that their monies are used well. Social control in their groups is high.

UNDP's efforts to alleviate poverty in Nigeria include the MicroStart project, which has been devised as a pilot programme to build the capacity of local organizations, and to initiate and upscale

existing savings and loan microfinance activities. After an extensive assessment of 49 local organizations, eight promising NGOs were chosen to participate in the three-year programme, five of which are in the south. In the first three years more than 500 million Naira have been distributed in loans approaching an average 11,000 Naira each. Three of the eight are likely to become ‘break through organizations’ in terms of their ability to make a profit and manage and sustain their efforts. Each of these has portfolio risk rates (a reflection on defaulting) of less than one percent. Two of these are in the south and include the Lift Above Poverty Organization, in Benin City, Edo State with over 4,000 members, and the Justice, Development and Peace Commission in Ogun State with over 4,100 members in both rural and urban branches.

USAID IPs have had experience with microfinance. The six Lagos Community Partners for Health under the BASICS I project overcame the barriers to microfinance participation by providing direct loans. The social sanctions and oversight were guaranteed by providing the loans through an established community organization, the CPH. CPHs had also established Savings and Thrift Cooperatives prior to the microfinance project, but according to CPH members, some were too poor to participate initially (i.e. start with mandatory savings), and therefore, microcredit allowed them access to credit they would otherwise have not had.

These microcredit projects have been running for five years and repayment is in the 90% range, though the major problem is that of delay, not defaulting. Loans are dispersed by the CPH’s microcredit committee, which reviews applications, on an 80% female and 20% male basis. Personal communication from recipients attests to their ability to start and manage small businesses that help them care for and educate their children.

USAID support to Country Women of Nigeria (COWAN) through CEDPA and Weidemann and Associates provided skill training and microfinance to over 2,000 women in their local CBOs known collectively as “100 Women’s Groups” Lagos. Weidemann and Associates also assisted the Oyo Farmer Agricultural Development Union (FADU) with the Value card payment system, a tool to successfully link the formal banking sector with 2,000 FADU clients who have access to FADU’s saving and loan services.

International corporations are also involved in microfinance. A program that links training and entrepreneurship was seen in Port Harcourt, the Entrepreneurial Development Initiative (ENDIP). ENDIP provides vocational and enterprise development training for CSWs and Youth. Their funding comes principally from Shell Oil. At present they are operating a \$74,000 fund, and at present there are 60 trainees, 25 of whom have completed their training and as part of the fund and are eligible for credit for an entrepreneurial activity that they identify. Citigroup sponsors microfinance through the NGO Growing Business Foundation in Nigeria.

Microfinance may assist young trainees to buy the equipment needed to start their jobs, but infrastructure barriers may be more than microfinance can overcome. Many small artisan businesses require electricity including hairdressing, photography, and appliance-repair, to name a few, rely on electricity, which is often unreliable and non-existent for long spells. One cannot expect each small entrepreneur to buy a portable generator (Chimezie, 2003).

Two other sources of self-help finance for young entrepreneurs are noteworthy. In small towns in Oyo State, youth who have finished their apprenticeship and need money to buy equipment and to start their trade commonly work as motorcycle taxi drivers or farm in order to earn needed capital. Older relatives may buy a motorcycle as an investment and have the young brother or cousin serve as driver. Land is still available in the southwest on request from communities and families. Depending on their needs, such youth may work from 2-5 years to earn enough capital to start their trade. There are reports of young people who find farming profitable and continue along that line. If agricultural inputs were more readily available in these communities, profitable farming might stem the tide of rural to urban migration.

Infrastructure is a Major Concern

BBC's Dan Isaacs recently visited Nnewi in the Southeast to learn about small manufacturing enterprises. Some of the difficulties these entrepreneurs face are outlined below.

I would combine bullet 3 with bullet 2

I would combine bullet 5 with bullet 4

- The country's manufacturing sector has been so run-down over the years that the export of processed products has all but collapsed under the weight of bad roads, intermittent power supply and limited pipe-borne water provision.
- On the shop floor of a machine tool factory the owner explained his operational problems as the absence of mains power, lack of water, and communications. "What we do is that we run our generator. For water, we harness rainwater," he said. These problems increase his production costs by 25%, he said.
- Another factory manager was not optimistic about the future. "I think we went to sleep. We relied too much on oil and it made everybody lazy, especially the leaders. Quite frankly. I think the country was better in 1960 than it is today. I think we are in deeper slumber now. In another 10 years, we will be more than 20 years behind," he says

Friday, 8 August, 2003, 08:46 GMT 09:46 UK
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3130297.stm>

2.4.6 Basic Education

Although Basic Education was not included in the scope of work for this assessment, it is important to recognize the role it plays in preparing people for employment. The table below shows that while the states in the south perform generally better in terms of literacy and basic education enrolment than national averages, there are some exceptions as well as zonal differences. In particular, Enugu and Ogun States are higher than average. The former has a higher than average male illiteracy rate, while the latter's female illiteracy rate exceeds the norm. Lagos has the lowest rate in the region and the nation (19.8%), followed by Rivers (20.3%) and Anambra (24.6%), in part likely due to the fact that educated people migrate to the city, i.e. Lagos, Port Harcourt and Onitsha, in search for employment.

While illiteracy rates in the working age population reflect gender differences of the past, gender ratios (F/M) in more recent primary school enrollment reflect on the future workforce. Most of the states in shown in the Table have a nearly equal or greater proportion of female students enrolling in primary school, much higher than the national average of 0.87. Enugu State stands out in the south with the lowest proportion of female enrollees and a gender ratio of 0.83. Basic female education is therefore, still a priority concern for the Southeast.

2.4.7 Conclusions

Several factors should be considered when developing a donor response. First, capacity building initiatives and skill development should be central in whatever option USAID chooses. The experience of OICI requires that such skill development be linked with skills in obtaining employment. Second, USAID should engage in interactive business dialogues with the organized private sector through an umbrella organization such as Nigerian Employers' Consultative Association (NECA).

Third, collaboration and coordination with other donors and stakeholders is needed in the development and management of initiatives for micro-credit. These schemes should not just address small business start-up for women but also enhance the ability of artisans, crafts makers and small

manufacturers start and maintain their enterprises, because it is these small enterprises that account for the bulk of job creation in recent years.

Table: Summary Education and Gender Statistics for the South

Zone	State	Rate of Illiteracy (%) ¹ Age 15 and Above, 1991			Primary School Gross Enrolment Gender Ratio ² (F/M) 1996
		Male	Female	Total	
Southeast	Abia	20.9	44.4	33.6	0.97
	Anambra	17.2	31.5	24.6	0.98
	Ebonyi* (see Enugu/Abia)				
	Enugu	36.0	59.8	49.5	0.83
	Imo	21.0	41.7	32.7	0.90
South-South	Akwa Ibom	24.4	46.7	36.5	1.03
	Bayelsa* (see Rivers)				
	Cross River	25.0	48.5	36.9	1.28
	Delta	20.8	50.6	36.4	1.11
	Edo	24.4	52.2	38.6	1.00
	Rivers	13.7	27.4	20.3	1.12
Southwest	Ekiti* (see Ondo)				
	Lagos	12.3	28.6	19.8	1.17
	Ogun	31.9	55.9	44.4	0.95
	Ondo	25.2	41.2	33.4	1.05
	Osun	26.8	50.5	39.5	1.00
	Oyo	27.3	49.0	38.5	1.02
All Nigeria		32.1	56.0	44.3	0.87

1. Source: Nigeria's 1991 population Census; *prior to creation of Ebonyi, Bayelsa and Ekiti States

2. Source: Statistics Branch, Federal Ministry of Education, Abuja. 30th June 1999.

2.5 Understanding HIV/AIDS in Southern Nigeria


HIV and AIDS have distinct zonal patterns throughout Nigeria and particularly in the southern States. The Figure below shows the differences among the three zones based on the 2001 sero-prevalence surveys. The states with the lowest prevalence rates are in the Southwest, those with the highest are in the South-South, and in the middle, one finds the Southeast. The table shows HIV prevalence results from two sources, a national survey done with women attending antenatal clinics (ANC) and a second from a national HIV and syphilis sentinel survey done in two urban communities in each state. The detailed Working Paper for this section is found in Annex F.

Table 3: HIV Seroprevalence Data by State and Zone

Southeast			South-South			Southwest		
State	ANC (range)	Sentinel	State	ANC (range)	Sentinel	State	ANC (range)	Sentinel
Abia	0-2.5	3.0	Akwa Ibom	> 10	12.5	Ekiti	0-2.5	2.2
Anambra	5.1-7.5	6.0	Bayelsa	5.1-7.5	4.3	Lagos	0-2.5	6.7
Ebonyi	5.1-7.5	9.3	Cross River	7.6-10	5.8	Ondo	5.1-7.5	2.9
Enugu	5.1-7.5	4.7	Delta	5.1-7.5	4.2	Ogun	0-2.5	2.5
Imo	0-2.5	7.8	Edo	5.1-7.5	5.9	Osun	0-2.5	3.7
			Rivers	7.6-10	3.3	Oyo	0-2.5	3.5
Zone		6.0	Zone		6.0	Zone		3.5

ANC: 2001 National Seroprevalence Survey, CDC, FMOH

Sentinel: 2001 National HIV/Syphilis Sentinel Survey from the Federal Ministry of Health



Unfortunately, there are limitations to both epidemiological and behavioral data that is currently available. National Sero-prevalence studies have relied on women who attend ANC and do not pinpoint the most at risk groups. The only high-risk population studied across several states, though not in a nationally comprehensive way, is commercial sex workers (CSWs). A team of researchers based at the College of Medicine, University of Ibadan, is currently studying bridging populations such as long distance traders, and military personnel in Oyo State, but similar studies are needed in other parts of the country.

Concerning behavioral data, the bulk of HIV research and subsequent interventions have focused more on in-school adolescents and youth who represent possibly only half of that age cohort. While a focus on youth has been justified by the epidemiological finding that HIV prevalence is highest in the 15-24 year age group, it misses the dynamics of transmission among high-risk and bridging populations where the bulk of transmission is actually occurring.

2.5.1 Sexual Networking: a Conceptual Framework

Orubuloye and the Caldwells have provided a theoretical and practical understanding of sexual HIV transmission in Nigeria using the concept of sexual networking. This is an adaptation of social network theory. Networks in general have the characteristics of density and range. Density is the frequency and intensity of interaction among all the possible member of a network. Range describes the diversity or homogeneity of member characteristics. Innovations (new ideas, products and events, including diseases), spread more quickly and thoroughly within denser networks, but innovations must enter a network first. Entry is more likely to occur when a network has higher range or a greater variety of members who may in turn have contact with other networks. The spatial arrangements of sexual networks have many configurations. They may be confined to the residents of a rural town. Networks may be dual-local and have a community base in both a rural and an urban setting. Networks may also stretch along an inter-state roadway with nodes at truck stops and markets.

Social customs exert pressure on network structure. Early studies from some east and central African communities explained that the customs of delayed marriage age for men and norms of virginity before marriage for woman create a sexual network of a high range of young males patronizing a small group of female sex workers with disastrous effects on HIV transmission (Piot and Carael, 1988). Nigerian HIV/AIDS control would benefit from similar understanding of its own sexual networks and how these manifest in different parts of the country.

Some general distinctions of sexual networking that are unique to the south of the country have been documented. For example, studies have found that southern CSWs are more likely to have secondary education. They feel that their education raises them above manual occupations in agriculture and trade (Caldwell, 1995). Thus, higher educational attainment in the southern part of the country may be a double-edged sword when appropriate employment is not available.

Women traders are a common phenomenon in the South. Studies have documented a high level of sexual networking among women traders, especially those who travel. In Benin City, over 70% of women traders reported having extra-marital sexual relationships (Omorodion, 1993). Community members perceived that women traders who go to Lagos used sex as a means to further their business interests (Ososanya and Brieger, 1992). Recent unpublished work by Olaleye and colleagues of the College of

Medicine, Ibadan, have documented levels of HIV infection higher than the general population among *alajapa*, the female traders who travel a region buying up farm produce in bulk for later sale in the cities.

Migrant labor is cross-zonal issue. Migrant farm labor is in high demand in the southwest. Most of the laborers come from either Benue or Kogi States in Nigeria, the former of which has the highest HIV prevalence in the country, or from neighboring Benin and Togo (Oyadoke, 2001). While many of the laborers are still children and not sexually active, the adult work team leaders are, and are major clients of CSWs in rural communities (Ajuwon *et al.*, 1993-94), and also have local girlfriends in the towns (Oyadoke, 2001).

More zone-specific information was acquired from literature, documents and interviews and is summarized in the sections that follow.

2.5.3 Southwest

Social norms on virginity have changed. Now young women believe that it is necessary to prove one's fertility prior to marriage (Renne, 1993; Oyeneye and Kawonise, 1993). Virginity is now viewed "as disease, as being unhealthy, anti-social and un-modern" (Renne, 1993). Caldwell (1995) provided the cultural perspective that, "Traditional norms have always considered barrenness as a greater sin than sexual activity." Young women now approve of premarital sex (Dada *et al.*, 1997-98). In the Southwest the tradition of paying bride price is becoming uncommon, and when observed involves token amounts of money and gifts. Under these circumstances the 'cost' of premarital sex is virtually eliminated. Again, it is not surprising that youth view abstinence as an unrealistic strategy to prevent HIV (Asuzu *et al.*, 1994).

Postpartum sexual abstinence is common in the southwest, especially among rural and more traditional couples (Feyisetan, 1990). The belief is that semen will spoil the breast milk. The taboo against sex during the breastfeeding period has obvious links with polygamy, but also leads husbands to seek sexual gratification outside the home during the up to 30 months that many women breastfeed (Caldwell *et al.*, 1990; Ajuwon *et al.*, 1993-94; Lawoyin, 2000). This cultural barrier to postpartum sex appears to be diminishing (Orubuloye, Oguntimehin and Sadiq, 1997).

Communities believe that men by nature are polygamous (Orubuloye, Caldwell and Caldwell, 1997). Ironically, polygamy itself is associated with greater extramarital sexual relationships of wives, especially the more junior wives (Caldwell *et al.*, 1990; Orubuloye *et al.*, 1991) who may be seeking sexual gratification and/or material support that their older husbands cannot provide (Boroffice, 1995).

From the foregoing, there appears to be a high level of sexual networking in the southwest, but ironically, next to the Northwest Zone, the southwestern states have among the lowest HIV rates in the nation. The implication is that while sexual networks may be dense, they may also be of low range. In fact, sexual networking appears to be somewhat egalitarian, with both young and old and men and women having active networks, but primarily within their own communities. This implies less potential for HIV entering the network, but once it does, a faster spread within the community. The somewhat closed nature of these networks is maintained even when people travel from rural to urban areas, since they seek out people from their own hometown for social, economic and sexual needs (Ososanya and Brieger, 1992).

Urban areas in the southwest are multi-ethnic and pose unique challenges to HIV control. The Society for Family Health (SFH), a local but independent affiliate of Population Services International (PSI) is a partner in the USAID/DfID Promoting Sexual and Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS Prevention (PSRHH) project currently being piloted in 13 'hot spot' or high risk communities. SFH staff described their experiences in the two Lagos and one Oyo State intervention communities and used the term "conflict" to describe these areas. Residents do not usually own the property on which they live and work, and therefore structures are often temporary in nature and frequently destroyed by the landowners. Residents engage in illegal activities including prostitution and selling drugs, which stimulate the Police

and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency officials to raid the communities, driving those at highest risk for HIV underground, making intervention difficult.

2.5.4 South-South

As discussed in many sections of this report, the South-South is noted for ‘hosting’ the petroleum industry. Being hosts (and hostesses) unfortunately leads to a form of sexual networking that can foster the spread of HIV. While the petroleum industry accounts for a very small proportion of the nation’s workforce, it may potentially have a disproportionate effect on the HIV epidemic. Lauterbach (2001) of USIS reporting on the Abuja HIV conference observed that, “Matthew Ahwata, of the Pengassan trade union group, noted that petroleum industry workers in his state are particularly vulnerable to HIV/AIDS. They are relatively well paid, and they often spend several weeks working in remote areas, followed by several weeks off, which they often spend in large cities, where they may be infected by HIV.”

According to Faleyimu *et al.*, (1999) non-indigene oil field workers are mobile, have relatively higher levels of disposable income, can be found in a variety work settings (e.g. tank fields, flow stations and oilrigs) and develop sexual relations with CSWs and the local population. These authors found that, “There was a high level of sexual networking (focused and diffuse), multi-partnered sex with its attendant multi-agent STIs.”

Confidential communication from a former employee of an indigenous AIDS NGO illustrated the dangers of the practice of sending young girls from the rural areas to serve as maids for urban households. “In Akwa Ibom young girls are pushed by their parents to take on jobs such as house-helpers and maids. While doing such jobs many are sexually harassed, abused and raped by their ‘masters’, the husbands of the house. This can increase the transmission rates among these vulnerable groups. When I was still in AIDS Alliance, a majority of the infected girls Akwa Ibom who came for counseling were house-help.”

2.5.5 Southeast

Family Health International conducted two qualitative assessments of factors relating to HIV transmission, prevention and care in Anambra State (Oke *et al.*, 2000; Okoye *et al.*, 2001). Two unique factors in that zone that may exert different pressures on the HIV epidemic were 1) the presence of two large market and commercial centers, Onitsha and Aba and 2) the widespread adherence to the Catholic faith.

According to Oke *et al.*, (2000), “Onitsha, one of its major cities, harbors one of the largest markets in the West African sub-region. Traders from across the sub-region visit Onitsha on a daily basis to do business. This has inevitably resulted in a boom in both trucking activities and sex trade,” factors that were said to have “massive” implications for HIV transmission. As evidenced in the agriculture section of this report, the Southeast is a zone of contrasts, in this case between some of the largest market cities in West Africa and poor rural farming communities where land is fragmented and losing productivity to poor farming techniques and erosion. The connection may be that young people, particularly males, who do not have access to land, drop out of school and are pressured to seek work in the large cities. Until they have enough funds to pay the traditionally high bride price demanded in the zone, are involved in sexual networking with CSWs.

The FHI report of 2001 states that, “Many community leaders, including those of the Catholic faith, abhor the use of condoms, which constitutes a major constraint to prevention programming among the general population.” A generally pronatalist norm pervades the community, regardless of specific religious affiliation, and ironically may even be responsible for risky extramarital sexual behavior. Ikechebelu *et al.* (2002) studied women being tested for infertility in Anambra State and found 7% were HIV positive. Those who were positive had more than twice as many sexual partners as those who were HIV-negative within the duration of their marriage. Only 58% of the husbands of the HIV-positive

women also had HIV. The authors concluded that, “Infertile women are exposed to a higher risk of HIV infection due to their promiscuous sexual behaviour in search of pregnancy.”

Another cultural factor that may encourage premarital sexual networking is the high bride price still demanded by families in the zone. This delays the age of marriage for both men and women until the man can acquire adequate wealth to afford a bride.

2.5.6 Political Support for HIV/AIDS Programs

High-level state government support exists in the four States visited, Anambra, Cross River, Lagos and Rivers, with State Action Committees on AIDS (SACAs) already inaugurated and functional in each. SACAs are pattern after the federal level National Action Committee on AIDS, which is based in the office of the Presidency and while drawing on input from all Ministries, is not part of any ministry. This enables NACA to coordinate government and non-governmental inputs more effectively.

The Futures Group Policy Project is in the process of assembling information on all SACAs and LACAs and was able to provide preliminary findings, though not at a zonal level. Lagos State led the way with SACA formation, and was used as a model. Half the remaining states officially formed SACAs in 2001, and the remainder did so in 2002. These range in membership from 12-230 with a mode of 30. Lagos had the largest SACA membership. Only half had offices and staff, and one-third had full-time staff. Only half were implementing any workplan, and state contribution to funding ranged from zero to N30 million. Most SACAs were unaware of the HIV/AIDS programming of potential partners.

It can therefore be asserted that “on paper” the political will is present, but whether the financial muscle to support such programs exists is a different matter all together. The current state of finding for the SACAs leaves much to be desired. Even less impressive is the level of political will among the Local Governments (i.e., the grassroots level). The Policy Project found that only 134 (approximately one-fifth) LGAs had functioning LACAs. For example in Cross River State, of the eighteen (18) LGAs, only ten (10) have their LACAs inaugurated and functional. This rather depressing shortfall is however, compensated by the existence of over forty Civil Society Organizations working on HIV/AIDS in Cross River State. This trend has obvious implications for USAID future programs and channeling of funds in the State.

Policy Formulation and Organizational Structure: Evidence from the States reveal that a formal policy on HIV/AIDS exist with SACAs having formal terms of references for their operations. In all the States, the multi-sectoral approach involving collaborating Ministries of Health, Education, Information, Youth, Women Affairs and Agriculture are in place. Apparently, what is deficient in operational terms is obvious lack of funds and the dire need for technical assistance and capacity building, which USAID can effectively provide.

Program Resources: As is evident from above, severe shortage of resources (financial and material) is a major handicap of HIV/AIDS services in the states. Apart from the sum of N2 million¹² provided for SACAs in 2001/2002, very little by way of financial muscle is available for the enormous task of the State Committees. The major source of support for HIV/AIDS programs/services much of which are provided by civil society organizations is from USAID-supported effort of FHI in Anambra State and Lagos, and Society For Family Health in Cross River State. Although many civil society organizations obtain funding and support from a wide range of donor agencies, the coordinating role that the SACAs are supposed to provide in the states is severely handicapped by financial constraints. Furthermore, the reluctance of the private sector to show any form of support with funding or equipment for prevention/care and support programs is lamentable. Except for Agip Oil Company in Rivers State,

¹² The value of the Naira ranged between 120-130 per dollar during this period

and Unilever in Lagos, that have made some long-term commitments in this regard, virtually nothing is happening elsewhere.

Evaluation, Monitoring and Research: For the USAID-supported programs in the States covered, monitoring and evaluation frameworks are effectively in place. One however expected that government in these States should complement their efforts by implementing regular HIV sentinel and behavioral surveillances. The absence of systematized surveillance implies that the program managers and other stakeholders are unable to ascertain the full impact of their efforts especially with regards to reduction of HIV infection rate and HIV-related behavior change. One of the main efforts of FHI in Lagos and Anambra States has to work with and strengthen LACAs in selected LGAs.

Human Rights: Across the states, anti discrimination laws and regulations do not exist. Consequently, PLWHA are severely discriminated against and stigmatized. The impact of course is that most people testing positive for HIV do not disclose their status, with the resultant spiraling of HIV infection rates in the States. The only hint of any such development is in Anambra where International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) has drafted and is pushing for the passage of a bill in the State Legislature on HIV/AIDS-related discrimination. This perhaps is an area in which USAID would consider urgent intervention.

2.5.7 Implications for Intervention

PSI/SFH is the major partner for social marketing of condoms (and contraceptives) and for mass media communications about HIV prevention. In 2002, SFH sold over 130 million condoms. Their distribution system consists of 8 depots, five of which are in the South. Three of these depots, Lagos, Onitsha and Aba, account for 85% of condom sales. This does not necessarily mean that 85% of ultimate consumer purchases take place in the south, because these three cities are major trading centers for the whole country and this pattern is similar to that of pharmaceutical products.

Unfortunately there is no mechanism yet in place to track actual sales beyond the warehouses. What is distinctly southern about the overall process, as explained by staff of SFH, is that generally in the country most wholesaling and distributing business, from building materials to pharmaceuticals, is run by people who originate from the Southeast. PSI/SFH is in the process of analyzing a behavioral study that will look closely at such indicators as condom use, and this activity needs to be institutionalized to support any intervention. In addition, the community-based approach currently being tested by the PSRHH project needs to be monitored, as it appears to have the potential for directly reaching those most at risk.

In the Southwest, school attendance may have an effect of delaying or suppressing sex. Education is highly valued in the West, and may therefore indirectly have a positive influence on HIV prevention. This also speaks to the possible advantages of school-based sexual health education programs (Araoye and Adegoke, 1996). USAID support along these lines would be indirect. First, efforts to promote female education and keep more children in school would have a salutary effect. Secondly, consultation with national and state agencies responsible for curriculum development would ensure that existing models, like the Life Planning Education developed and tested in Oyo State with DfID, are disseminated and adopted. At the same time, education without attention to job creation may create a more conducive climate for the spread of HIV.

The mass media is a major source of HIV and reproductive health information for youth in the (Tauna *et al.*, 1993; Rich and Barker, 1992). The fact that access to the mass media is greater in the southwest (NDHS, 2000) implies that this strategy is especially appropriate in that zone. This component is being addressed in the PHRSS project by PSI/SFH and will continue to play a central part in the Missions' HIV control efforts.

In Lagos State an HIV/AIDS hotline sponsored by USAID through the Johns Hopkins University's Center for Communication Programs (CCP) provides youth with information and confidential counseling. More information is needed on the reach and capacity of this and other such programs, but it does fit into the more urbanized lifestyle of the Southwest. As more and more people have access to telephone service using cell/GSM phones, this type of information and outreach service may need expansion.

One would assume with the major presence of petroleum companies in the South-South zone, that this industry could play a major role in HIV prevention. Shell reports that, "Through Shell supported health facilities some 90,000 individuals had access to HIV/AIDS awareness training and information about other sexually transmitted diseases. We will continue to liaise closely with our partners and stakeholders to help to contain this serious threat to the nation's health and wealth. Our partners in health care (include) State Ministries of Education and Health in Rivers, Abia, Bayelsa, Imo, Akwa Ibom, Delta, and Edo States." Donor and indigenous agencies and NGOs with whom Shell says it works include VSO, Africare, STOPAIDS, Planned Parenthood Federation of Nigeria, Forward Africare (Owerri), Ogoni Youth Development Project, and Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta. The major focus of Africare's program, which is based in Rivers State, is on care and support of orphans, with some work on reproductive health education for youth. This is an example of joint USAID and oil company funding.

Chevron-Texaco describes its activities in more detail (www.chevrontexaco.com). "Chevron Nigeria's approach acknowledged that the HIV risk of their employees was inseparable from the HIV risk in the surrounding community and so embraced the wider group from the outset. However, successful delivery meant tailoring and targeting interventions; for male oil workers, their partners, sex workers, and young people." The company reports on baseline KAP surveys among employees, awareness activities for the community, employees and their children, VCT and ARVs in its employee and community clinics, treatment of opportunistic infections, and collaboration with national policy and research bodies.

The challenge is one of coordination among oil company programs and those who receive oil company funds. Jay Pryor, Managing Director of Chevron Nigeria, Ltd., spoke at the 2003 Sullivan Summit saying, "The Nigerian Business Coalition Against HIV/AIDS, inaugurated last February by President Olusegun Obasanjo, has made some good progress so far. But we need more participants, and we all need to do more. An important mandate of the coalition is to facilitate the sharing of information among business organizations and to communicate the techniques and strategies that work." A major component of that sharing and coordination is the technical expertise, which USAID needs to provide.

FHI and CEDPA have a history of working with CSOs in the South-South zone on HIV/AIDS education as well as on reproductive health rights. What seems clear from the foregoing is the need to expand intervention beyond empowering individual CSOs and working with organizations that have state- and zonal-wide reach such as Catholic and other major denominations.

Catholic Secretariat in Nigeria does have an HIV/AIDS policy, which is very explicit on the issue of condoms. The church's policy is to provide accurate and full information regarding the effectiveness of condoms but does not promote the use of condoms. Instead it promotes abstinence and mutual fidelity. Taking into account the policies, strengths and limitations of each group is necessary for effective collaboration and programming.


3. Conclusions

Three major lessons arise from the findings. First, the five core development issues in the scope of work are themselves interrelated. Secondly, policy intervention needs to be integrated from national to state to local government levels in order to ensure full and equitable implementation. Thirdly,

community-based organizations and civil society organizations play a crucial role in promoting all aspects of development reviewed in this report, but they will be most effective in advocacy and bringing about lasting change if they can be linked by networks and umbrella organizations that reach state and national levels.

As the fieldwork progressed, the interrelationship of development issues contained in the Scope of Work for this assessment became abundantly clear. This may be most glaring in the South-South. As seen in the figure below, pollution from oil production, both in terms of spills and raised temperatures from flaring impacts on agriculture. Farmland potential and fishing grounds are destroyed, driving people off the land and increasing unemployment. Conflict arises either when indigenes confront the polluters or government agencies that support them, or when they migrate to cities and unwanted minorities. Some move to communities that spring up around oil fields and these become ‘hotspots’ for HIV transmission.

The PSRHH formative research and community needs assessment shows how these HIV hotspot communities become a nexus for many development problems. Unemployment has driven many residents to the urban area, including prostitutes whose level of education makes rural handwork unappealing. These communities are socially and politically peripheral located near motor parks, military reservations and major markets and often on land where they do not have the right to build permanent structures should not be built. This outsider status puts residents in constant conflict with urban authorities and denies them services, such as environmental waste management. In fact insecurity, arising from robbery and police harassment, and environmental problems like crowding, waste buildup and flooding are the common concerns of residents.



The multifaceted problems in the South-South have led to various donor, government and private sector initiatives. Oil companies now sponsor community clinics, schools and microfinance programs. NGOs like the New Nigeria Foundation (NNF) and the Community Development Foundation (CDF) target states in the delta with community based health, finance and agriculture projects. Oil companies collaborate with these NGOs as for example AGIP contracting with CDF to channel microfinance to local credit

societies, and Mobil-Exxon sponsoring malaria services within NNFs community based health organizations. Government has established the parastatal Niger Delta Development Corporation, which in turn receives funding from donors like the World Bank.

There is little doubt that everyone wants to get into the act of helping develop this previously neglected region. This shows that the desire by USAID and other donors to leverage financial support for HIV control, youth training and agricultural development, for example, from the private sector and large international donors is feasible. The question arises as to whether the input of all these disparate bodies can be coordinated to have a lasting impact on community development or whether they will result in nothing more than helping companies and government to assuage their guilt while still maintaining tight control on the centerpiece of the national economy. Comprehensive and interrelated development policies

are needed at federal, state and local levels in order to ensure that all players are working toward the same goals in a comprehensive way.

A related question is whether the parties involved have the intention of engaging the communities in the delta as partners in their own development, or simply keeping them in their place. Perspectives on the role of the petroleum companies in the violence vary. They are seen by some simply as bystanders, watching as government forces react to protestors. Others see them as sources of humanitarian assistance, helping evacuate villages in distress during outbreaks of violence and providing health and social services in neglected communities. Other observers assume complicity by the companies in the violence and human rights abuses.¹³

Two major policy issues need to be addressed for progress to be made.

- First, government seriously needs to address the question of distribution of wealth from the nation's natural resources. The states most affected by pollution, dislocation and unemployment need access to the resources needed to overcome these problems.
- Secondly, issues of security and insecurity must be resolved. Neither neglect, charity nor violence will solve the development problems of the region. Communities need to live in security for them to take an active part in their own development.

The role of community-based organizations and interventions was a common feature of many USAID, NGO and other donor activities, whether in urban or rural areas. BASICS' CPHs addressed a variety of health and development issues ranging from child immunization, HIV prevention, family planning, environmental sanitation and conflict prevention. The New Nigeria Foundation's Community Health Services Program stresses co-management and co-financing in participating communities. PSRHH involves community opinion leaders in needs assessments and peer education to prevent HIV. FHI and CEDPA have worked with a wide variety of CBOs in creating awareness and personal action to prevent HIV, demand reproductive health rights and provide care and support for people affected by AIDS. Farmers' cooperatives serve as a base for extension work and microfinance.

Some of these programs have tried to link CBOs with a higher level of organization, whether it be a national level NGO like the Country Women's Organization of Nigeria or a Local Action Committee for AIDS. Individual groups like CPHs may also have undertaken advocacy to get services and support from Local Government Councils and Departments. Generally, such links rarely go higher than the LGA level or tie into state and federal advocacy channels. Just as policy making to support development must be integrated from federal to state to LGA, community participation through CBOs must be linked through effective networks to state and federal organizations capable to influencing the policy making process.

4. Recommendations

In keeping with the spirit of the scope of work and the basic Concept Paper of the Mission, the recommendations reflect an integration of development issues adapted to zonal needs.

Southwest: Agriculture may be a solution to the problems of urbanization and unemployment in the southwest. A package of agricultural inputs and microfinance would enable some young people to stay in small communities in the southwest where food production for urban markets is a major business. The higher education level of many of these you would augur well for their willingness to adopt new practices, especially those that would protect the environment, if adequate extension/education services are made available.

¹³ Corporate Accountability Project of The Natural Heritage Institute, The Nautilus Institute and Human Rights Advocates.
<http://www.humanrightsadvocates.org/newsletter.summer2001.html>

USAID Implementing Partners have pioneered community-based approaches to health and development during the transition period. Community based organizations offer a strong potential for developing social networking interventions that can address needs ranging from microfinance to HIV/AIDS prevention and care. Further development of these interventions requires strategies of greater linkage across local governments and states by working through or helping create umbrella or multiplier organizations, also known as intermediate NGOs that can not only help channel and manage financial and technical support to the grassroots, but also serve as better advocates for community concerns.

Southeast: Although a good portion of the agricultural portfolio of USAID Nigeria is focused on the Southeast, land tenure and related gender issues in the zone still pose a challenge to making small-scale agricultural innovations contribute to the zone's development. Community-based efforts by local the New Nigeria Foundation are examples that need to be studied and taken to scale in terms of involving women in agriculture and its economic benefits.

There is a strong entrepreneurial spirit in the Southeast that needs to be tapped for zonal employment and development prospects. The possibility of linking agriculture and indigenous industry therefore is recommended in this zone. Since the Mission has been working in Agriculture in Abia, and since Aba, one of the largest commercial centers in the zone is also in Abia, these links could be pursued with greater involvement by state authorities.

Ironically, Anambra State, home of another major commercial center, Onitsha, is an HIV/AIDS focal state, but not an agriculture focal state. Agriculture and micro-enterprise may be key interventions to give families and communities the necessary resources for care and support, and thus better integration of USAID's technical sectors in Anambra is also recommended.

South-South: Conflict and the environment appear to be overriding issues in the South-South, and yet those items are quite small in the USAID Nigeria portfolio. As this is being written, there are new flare-ups of conflict that could be better termed combat in Delta State. Work with CSOs and conflict mitigation strategies do not appear to have been adequate to address this problem, and further study is needed to determine how government's role is aiding or promoting conflict.

Input from other parties is needed. The role of global petroleum companies in the process has not been fully determined – either as cause or solution to the problem. Communities are fighting themselves, often because they are powerless to attack the root causes in government neglect or suppression. Community leaders, who traditionally served roles as mediators of conflict, thus lack legitimacy. International donor agencies and petroleum companies have been in communication about potential development efforts in the region, but it appears that programs are being developed 'for' communities and not 'with' grassroots participation.

New forums for conflict resolution in the zone must be explored, which involve all parties in meaningful communication. A process of monitoring these forums and resultant conflict solutions is needed, and this should draw on the expertise of international and Nigerian human rights organizations.

Additional Work: At present there are four major outstanding issues that need further study:

- Agriculture is being implemented in Abia and Cross Rivers States with links to IITA in Ibadan, Oyo State, and its field Station in Onne, Rivers State. Further study is needed to learn how the work in Abia could be linked to issues of entrepreneurship in the zone, and hence employment opportunities. Although there is a reluctance to focus more agricultural resources in Oyo State per se, as mentioned above, agriculture, with appropriate inputs, could serve as a source of

employment in the zone. Since this is the base of IITA, it would seem appropriate to study how the institution, possibly through ADPs, could address these issues.

- As outlined above, additional study of the conflict situation in the South-South is mandatory, since existing approaches have proven inadequate to solving the problem.
- The idea of 'waste-to-wealth' has been raised in Annexes, but there is little evidence of this approach being implemented. We saw one small example, cement block making, in Onne. UNDP is said to be trying something along these lines in the Ibadan area. If properly structured, waste-to-wealth, could hold some potential to address both youth unemployment and waste management through a single intervention. This needs further exploration.
- An overarching issue that arises from the section on conflict is the need to study the policy making process in greater depth. Advocacy from civil society is in its infancy in Nigeria and still needs nurturing. Policy making at the top has become a high art form in Nigeria, but such policies rarely have involved state and local governments, who must implement the policies, not the public who are the recipients of policies' supposed benefits. A better understanding of the policy process and the gaps are needed around key issues such as the environment and conflict.